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Decades of research have demonstrated that episodic memory is vulnerable to 
significant semantic distortion (Gallo, 2006).  Recent findings suggest that short-term 
memory is susceptible to similar distortions of meaning.  The present investigations 
explore the cognitive and neural mechanisms of memory distortions that emerge within a 
few seconds of encoding.  Findings demonstrate false recall and recognition of unstudied 
lure items only 3-4 seconds following encoding of a short, 4-item memory set, and show 
that correct rejections of lures are associated with considerable semantic interference (SI).  
An fMRI investigation of these effects suggests a distinction between the left mid-
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (L VLPFC), which shows increased activity changes 
associated with increased SI, and the right posterior parietal cortex (R PPC) which shows 
increased activity associated with declines in SI.  An investigation of interactions 
between SI and proactive interference (PI) in short-term memory shows that vulnerability 
to PI is mediated by the semantic relationship between recently studied items and current 
memoranda.   Taken together, findings are consistent with unitary, activation-based 
models of memory (Nairne, 2002), and reveal the considerable vulnerability of verbatim 











 Human memory is arguably our most precious faculty.  Our memories allow us to 
consider and respond to stimuli no longer present in our sensory environment, learn from 
past experience, and form meaningful relationships.  Generally, we trust that our 
recollections provide an accurate record of our experiences.  Decades of research have 
shown, however, that memory is not akin to an internal video of the past.   Early work by 
Bartlett (1932) spoke directly to the vulnerability of memory, demonstrating that recall 
for unfamiliar narratives can be influenced by the cultural context of readers.  Readers 
make both errors of commission, in which they insert unstudied information into 
memorized passages, and errors of omission in which they fail to reproduce memoranda 
that are inconsistent with their expectations.   Bartlett was followed thirty years later by 
Underwood (1965) who demonstrated the associative nature of memory by showing that 
subjects were more likely to incorrectly recognize words that were related in meaning to 
those presented in a continuous stream of memoranda.  Underwood (1965) interpreted 
this finding as evidence for an associative network through which unstudied items were 
internally generated via spreading semantic activation, an interpretation consistent with 
later demonstrations of semantic priming (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971), and with 
models of associative memory (Anderson & Bower, 1973). 
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Modern investigations of memory errors can generally be separated into one of 
two broad categories: those that investigate semantic distortions of episodic and 
autobiographical memory, and those that examine interference-related distortions of 
short-term memory.  One reason for this separation is that dominant multi-store models 
of memory have assumed a relatively strict division between the psychological and neural 
mechanisms subserving short- and long-term memory (see Jonides, Lewis, Nee, Lustig, 
et al., 2008).  Semantic, or meaning-based processing, has been generally considered the 
provenance of episodic memory, and errors related to meaning have been attributed to 
this system regardless of the time-frame in which they occur.  Perceptually-based visual 
and phonological codes, on the other hand, have been considered the hallmarks of short-
term memory (Baddeley, 1966, 1972, 1986).  
 
Distortions of episodic memory 
In the last two decades, there has been remarkable growth in the study of episodic 
memory distortions, and the term false memory has been widely used to describe 
instances in which our memories fail to represent events as they truly occurred.  Striking 
examples of this vulnerability come from findings that indicate even memories for highly 
salient life-altering events are often distorted.  For example, most people will report 
remembering the precise circumstances under which they learned of catastrophic 
historical events such as the assassination of U.S. President Kennedy or the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  However, research on the topic has shown even 
memories such as these, which are often reported in rich sensory detail and with high 
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confidence (Brown & Kulik, 1977), are often distorted and subject to change over time 
(Neisser, 1982, 1986; Neisser & Harsch, 1990; Lee & Brown, 2003; Talarico & Rubin, 
2003; Greenberg, 2004; Wolters & Goudsmit, 2005; Conway, Skitka, Hemmerich, & 
Kershaw, 2009; Hirst, Phelps, Buckner, Budson, et al., 2009).  Furthermore, such 
memories sometimes include factual inaccuracies, which provide indisputable evidence 
of distortion.  A famous example comes from recounts of September 11th, 2001 made by 
then U.S. President Bush, and countless others, who confidently reported having seen the 
first airplane strike the World Trade Center on that day, an event that was not televised 
(Greenberg, 2004). 
Other studies of autobiographical memory have shown that recollections of 
childhood experiences are surprisingly vulnerable to intrusions, particularly when 
misleading information is introduced by a credible source (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; 
Loftus, 1997, 2003). The study of autobiographical memory is challenging, however, as it 
is difficult to maintain experimental control over stimuli and retention intervals.  Except 
in rare cases, it is also difficult to prove an autobiographic memory is spurious.  For this 
reason, many investigators have turned to techniques that allow them to examine false 
recall and recognition of memoranda presented in controlled laboratory settings.   
In the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995), participants study lists of words, all related in meaning to a common 
theme word, which is unstudied. At test, subjects are then asked to either recall or 
recognize these memoranda.  For example, their first study of this kind, Roediger and 
McDermott (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) presented subjects with lists of related 
memoranda at a rate of one word every 1-2 seconds. A subject might study nose, breathe, 
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sniff, aroma, hear, see, nostril, whiff, scent, reek, stench, fragrance, perfume, salts, and 
rose.  At the end of study list, some participants freely recalled memoranda, while others 
engaged in a distracter task for 2 minutes prior to studying the next list.  Several minutes 
after study of the 16th and final list, all subjects were then given a recognition task which 
asked them to identify studied items from a list of probes that included studied words, 
unstudied words that were the themes associated with studied items (smell, in our 
example), and unstudied words that were not semantically associated with memoranda.  
Recall results showed that veridical recall was best for the first and last few presented 
items, consistent with a standard serial position curve (Waugh & Norman, 1965; 
Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968).  False intrusions of theme words were made at a rate that 
rivaled correct recall for items presented toward the middle of the list. Rates of false 
recognition were also high.  Regardless of whether they had engaged in free recall, 
participants falsely recognized theme items at a rate that far exceeded their false alarms to 
unassociated probes.  In some cases, the false alarm rate to lures even approached the hit 
rate for items that were actually studied, suggesting participants could not distinguish 
between the two. 
Subsequent research has revealed the robustness of the false memory 
phenomenon across multiple modalities and stimulus sets.  False memory effects occur 
with both visually and aurally presented word lists, as well as picture stimuli (Roediger, 
McDermott, & Robinson, 1998; Gallo, McDermott, Percer, & Roediger, 2001; Roediger, 
McDermott, Pisoni, & Gallo, 2004; Gallo, 2006 for review).  Furthermore, though 
verbatim recognition decreases with increasing retention intervals, rates of false 
recognition either remain stable or increase over time (Gallo, 2006), a finding that has 
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been interpreted as evidence for a dissociation between familiarity-based and item-
specific processes in recognition memory (see Yonelinas & Levy, 2002; Diana, Reder, 
Arndt, & Park, 2006).  
 
Distortions of short-term memory 
 The term false memory has been used almost exclusively in reference to meaning-
based distortions of episodic memory, as described above.  There is, however, ample 
evidence for intrusions and distortions in short-term memory.  For example, when asked 
to immediately recall visually presented letters, subjects are vulnerable to acoustic 
intrusions, such as replacing a studied B with a similar sounding item, such as a C or P 
(Conrad, 1964).  When subvocal rehearsal is prevented by the introduction of articulatory 
suppression, these phonological errors are eliminated (Murray, 1968; Peterson & 
Johnson, 1971). Visual similarity effects have also been demonstrated in both recognition 
and recall paradigms, with subjects erroneously reporting having studied words that were 
visually similar to memoranda (Arons & Mason, 1999; Logie, Della Sala, Wynn, & 
Baddeley, 2000). 
 Short-term memory is also vulnerable to proactive interference.  For instance, in 
short-term item recognition, subjects are both slower and less accurate in rejecting 
negative probes that appeared as memoranda on a previous trial (Monsell, 1978), a 
finding that has been taken as evidence that a controlled interference resolution process 
may be recruited to support of accurate retrieval from short-term memory in such cases 
(see Jonides & Nee, 2006 for review).   
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Phonological and visual interference effects have been taken as evidence that 
phonological and visual representations are the primary codes utilized in short-term 
memory, a view that is most strongly evident in Baddley’s model of working memory 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1986).  This model assumes that maintenance of 
information in short-term memory is carried out by storage buffers specialized for 
phonological and visual-spatial processing, the contents of which can be accessed and 
manipulated by a central executive.  
Semantic influences on short-term remembering have been more difficult to 
quantify.  Although early investigations showed some evidence of semantic interference 
(e.g. Baddeley, 1966a, 1966b; Dale & Gregory, 1966; Kintsch & Buschke, 1969; 
Shulman, 1970; Baddeley & Levy, 1971; Shulman, 1972) these findings were largely 
dismissed in light of strong evidence supporting a dominant role for phonological codes 
(Baddeley, 1986).  As such, well-documented effects such as semantic proactive 
interference in immediate recall (Wickens, 1973) and semantic influences on memory 
span (Baddeley, 1966b; see also Hulme, Maughan, & Brown, 1991) have not been 
considered distortions of short-term memory, despite the time frame in which they occur.  
More recent work has questioned the notion that semantic coding is unique to 
long-term memory.  While some have argued for distinct semantic codes in short-term 
memory (Hamilton & Martin, 2005; Martin, Shelton, & Yafee, 1994), others have 
questioned the veracity of multi-store models altogether (e.g. Cowan, 2001; McElree, 






Unitary vs. multi-store models of memory 
  While multi-store models argue for a psychological and neural dissociation 
between short- and long-term memory, unitary models generally argue the contents of 
short-term memory may be best described as the activated contents of long-term memory 
(Cowan, 2001; McElree, 2001; Oberauer, 2002; Jonides, et al., 2008).  Early support for 
the neural dissociation of short- and long-term memory came from observed double 
dissociations between patients with medial temporal lobe lesions, who appeared to 
exhibit selective deficits in episodic memory (Scoville & Milner, 1957), and those with 
damage to left perisylvian regions, who demonstrate deficits in phonological processing 
and short-term retention (Warrington & Shallice, 1969).  However, recent accounts have 
questioned the selectivity of these deficits (see Ranganath & Blumenfeld, 2005).  
Furthermore, neuroimaging investigations have revealed considerable overlap between 
the neural regions supporting short- and long-term remembering in neurologically intact 
subjects (e.g., Cabeza, Dolcos, Graham, & Nyberg, 2002; Ranganath, Johnson, & 
D'Esposito, 2003; Karlsgodt, Shirinyan, van Ep, Cohen, & Cannon, 2005).  
 Although such findings propose a challenge to dual-storage accounts, overlap 
between the neural correlates of short- and long-term memory are consistent with unitary 
accounts which assume only a single set of memory representations.  Although unitary 
models differ with respect to the number of representations that may be active 
simultaneously (see Jonides, et al., 2008), most assume that the representations 
themselves are multidimensional.  For example, according Nairne’s (2002) feature-based 
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model, memory representations consist of a constellation of activated cues corresponding 
to task-relevant aspects of memoranda, such their phonological, lexical and semantic 
features.  These activated cues are then used to reconstruct the memoranda at retrieval.  
 
Overview of the present dissertation 
Over the past 40 years the assumption that semantic representations are unique to 
episodic memory may have diverted interest away examining the extent to which we are 
vulnerable to rapid distortions of meaning.  Given the potential influence of such 
distortions on immediate behavior across a variety of contexts, this is a topic of 
considerable practical importance.  
The present research directly addresses this topic by examining the rapid 
acquisition of false memories and semantic interference.  In Chapter II, I introduce a 
short-term variation on the DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), 
and demonstrate that false recognition and recall of unstudied lure items can occur only 
seconds following encoding.  I also find evidence that short-term remembering is 
vulnerable to considerable semantic interference effects, wherein the correct rejection 
lures is slowed relative to correct rejection of unrelated items.  
In Chapter III, I go on to examine the neural mechanisms underlying these 
semantic distortions.  I suggest a dissociation between the left ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex and right intra-parietal sulcus regions, with the former showing increased 
activation associated with increases in semantic interference, and the latter demonstrating 
increased activation associated with reduced vulnerability to false recognition.   
 9 
Chapter IV presents an investigation of the relationship between proactive and 
semantic interference in short-term memory.  Here, I demonstrate that the semantic 
context of probes presented in an item recognition task can change the degree to which 
we are vulnerable to proactive interference from previously studied information.  In my 
concluding remarks (Chapter V), I summarize findings, offer some additional theoretical 
considerations, and explore future directions.  
Taken together, this body of work provides important insights into the 
mechanisms underlying rapid distortions of memory.  By incorporating approaches from 
multiple domains of memory research, this work will contribute to the development of 
more accurate models of cognitive control and action in the real world.  Furthermore, the 
research serves as a step towards revealing the circumstances that may increase our 
vulnerability to memory errors (e.g., distraction, aging, pathology), and may therefore 
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FALSE WORKING MEMORIES:  




 False memories are well-established, episodic memory phenomena: Semantically 
related associates are confidently and erroneously remembered as studied items. We 
report four experiments yielding similar effects in a working memory paradigm. Four 
semantically related words were retained over a brief interval. Whether or not the interval 
was filled with a math verification task, semantically related lures were mistakenly 
recognized as members of the memory set and took longer to reject than did unrelated 
negative probes. In a short-term recall task, semantic intrusions exceeded other errors 
(e.g., phonemic). Our results demonstrate false memory effects for a subspan list when a 
mere 4 sec was given between study and test. Such rapid semantic errors presumably 
result from associative processing, may be related to familiarity-based proactive 
interference in working memory, and are consistent with recent models that integrate 





Episodic remembering is often associated with the feeling that we are, in some 
way, reexperiencing or reliving past events. We may vividly recall sights, sounds, tastes, 
and feelings associated with events that occurred minutes, days, or years ago. Despite this 
subjective experience, research shows that our long-term memories are not always 
reliable representations of the past (Roediger, 1996; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 
Schacter & Slotnick, 2004). Such memories, rather, may differ dramatically from true 
events and, in some cases, may actually be “false,” either in part or in their entirety, 
reflecting events that never truly occurred (Loftus, 1997; Roediger, 1996; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). 
Research on false memories has focused on long-term episodic memory, 
exploring how recall and recognition of previously studied material can become distorted, 
generally over a period ranging from minutes to days. In the Deese–Roediger–
McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), participants 
study 15-item word lists, all of which are semantically related to an unstudied theme 
word. The participants then recall as many words as possible from the list or recognize 
studied words presented in a second list that includes studied words, the unstudied theme 
word, and other unassociated and unstudied foils. Investigations using the DRM 
paradigm consistently show that participants both falsely recall and falsely recognize 
unstudied theme words. Confidence ratings or remember/know judgments typically 
indicate moderate confidence in these decisions (e.g., Frost, 2000; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995; Schacter & Slotnick, 2004). 
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Although the false memory phenomenon has been investigated largely in the 
long-term memory domain, search on short-term working memory indicates that this 
system too is fallible (Baddeley, 2003; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Working memory is 
susceptible to several forms of interference, wherein accurate and timely recall or 
recognition can be disrupted by interfering information. The interfering effects of 
phonological and visual similarity were established early on (Arons & Mason, 1999; 
Conrad, 1964; Logie, Della Sala, Wynn, & Baddeley, 2000). However, despite several 
well-documented semantic effects, such as semantically based proactive interference 
(Wickens, 1973) and semantic influences on memory span (Baddeley, 1966; Crowder, 
1978; see also Hulme, Maughan, & Brown, 1991), semantic interference effects on short-
term remembering were originally found to be less robust, less consistent (e.g., Baddeley, 
1966, 1972; Baddeley & Dale, 1966; Baddeley & Levy, 1971; Dale & Gregory, 1966; 
Kintsch & Buschke, 1969; Shulman, 1970, 1972), and generally weaker than those 
associated with long-term memory. Consequently, semantic coding was historically 
considered a signature of episodic long-term memory, whereas models of verbal short-
term working memory emphasized lower level phonological codes (Baddeley, 1966, 
1972, 1986). This dichotomy, which is inconsistent with many current models of memory 
(Baddeley, 2000; Cowan, 1999, 2005; Haarmann & Usher, 2001; Nairne, 2002), may 
have diverted interest away from the question of whether short-term remembering is 
susceptible to false memory effects. 
More recently, the possibility of short-term semantic coding has become more 
widely recognized. Patient studies indicate that working memory may include separable 
components dedicated to the short-term maintenance of semantic information (Hamilton 
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& Martin, 2005; Martin, Shelton, & Yafee, 1994). Moreover, the idea of short-term 
semantic representations is readily handled by models that conceptualize working 
memory as the activated portion of long-term memory (Cowan, 1999, 2005; Haarmann & 
Usher, 2001; Nairne, 2002; Oberauer, 2002; cf. Baddeley, 2000). The view that working 
memory and episodic long-term memory are mediated by overlapping and shared 
components is also supported by evidence gleaned from brain imaging studies (e.g., 
Cabeza, Dolcos, Graham, & Nyberg, 2002; Karlsgodt, Shirinyan, van Ep, Cohen, & 
Cannon, 2005; Ranganath, Johnson, & D’Esposito, 2003). 
These developments are consistent with the possibility that false memories may 
occur rapidly, on the time scale of working memory tasks, and may not require the use of 
supraspan lists of memoranda. Rapidly occurring associative processes constitute the 
basis for one of the popular explanations of the false memory effect in long-term 
remembering (Roediger, McDermott, & Robinson, 1998). According to this account, 
theme words semantically related to studied items become activated via associative 
processes in semantic memory (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Underwood, 1965; see also 
Arndt & Reder, 2003), much like semantic priming effects that are evident within 
seconds following exposure to a prime (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971).  
Our present purpose, therefore, was to test the hypothesis that false recognition 
and false recall can occur within a canonical working memory paradigm, with subspan 
lists of memoranda. The first pair of experiments (1A and 1B) used recognition and 
recall, respectively. Memory sets of four semantically related words were followed by a 
3- to 4-sec retention interval that was filled with a mathematical distractor task, making 
trials similar in structure to the operation span task that is widely used to investigate 
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working memory (Smith et al., 2001; Turner & Engle, 1989). In the recognition task 
(Experiment 1A), the retention interval was followed by one of three probe types: a 
positive probe that had appeared in the memory set for that trial, a negative probe that 
had not appeared and was not associated with items in the memory set, or a lure probe 
that was semantically associated but not part of the memory set.  In the recall task 
(Experiment 1B), participants engaged in free recall of memory items following the 
retention interval. Identical procedures were used in the second pair of experiments (2A 
and 2B), except that the distractor task was omitted, thereby permitting subvocal 
rehearsal. In all four experiments, false memory effects were robust, indicating that 
semantic memory distortions can occur when attempting to retain only four items over a 
mere 3- to 4-sec delay.  
We also predicted that response time (RT) measures of recognition performance 
would be sensitive to the semantic association between the probe and the memory set, 
consistent with previous findings by Bartha, Martin, and Jensen (1998). In an item 
recognition task in which four unassociated words were used as memoranda, Bartha et al. 
found significant slowing when participants correctly rejected nonstudied synonyms or 
associates of the memory set. In the present experiments, we found that participants took 







The participants were 24 right-handed University of Michigan students (12 of 
them male; mean age: 19.25 years). The participants in this experiment and in all the 
subsequent experiments participated for course credit. 
Materials 
The stimuli were presented on Dell personal computers using E-Prime 1.1 
software (www.pstnet.com). Button-press responses were collected using a Cedrus Model 
RB-730 response pad (www.cedrus.com). All the stimuli appeared in a black Arial 20-
point font. 
Item recognition task. Forty-eight lists were created from a sub-set of 55 
previously published lists shown to elicit episodic false memories (Roediger, Watson, 
McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). Each list consisted of four semantically related words, all 
associates of a common theme word. Only one memory set of four words was created 
from each original list. These 48 new lists were divided into four groups of 12 four-word 
lists (Groups A–D) that were equated in mean backward associative strength (M =.34 for 
each group of lists). Theme words served as the probes on all the trials, and no theme 
words were repeated for a given participant. Each participant completed 36 trials: 12 
trials were paired with a lure, which was the theme word associated with that list; 12 
trials were paired with an unrelated negative probe, which was a theme word associated 
with a nonpresented list; and 12 trials were paired with a positive probe. On positive 
probe trials, one item from the constructed list was replaced with the theme word for that 
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list, which also served as the positive probe. Probe type was counterbalanced with word 
lists across participants, so that for one quarter of all the participants, lists in Group A 
were paired with lure probes, lists in Group B with negative probes, and lists in Group C 
with positive probes. Themes associated with Group D lists served as the unrelated 
negative probes. There were a total of four counterbalanced groups, with N/4 subjects in 
each. This procedure ensured that all the participants encountered the same probes, all 
theme words, but in different contexts, as lures, negative probes, or positive probes. 
Trials were presented in random order for each participant. No participant was exposed to 
a given theme or probe more than once during the experiment. 
Distractor task. A math equation verification task based on the operation span 
task (Turner & Engle, 1989) was adapted from Smith et al. (2001). During the retention 
interval of the memory task, the participants viewed a completed math equation, decided 
whether or not it was solved correctly, and responded accordingly. In each equation, the 
first operation was always multiplication or division; the second was always addition or 
subtraction. 
Procedure 
The participants first provided written informed consent; all research was 
approved by the Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board at the University of 
Michigan. A short set of practice trials, with memory sets consisting of four unrelated 
words, then familiarized them with the task demands. At the beginning of each trial, the 
participants saw a black fixation cross, which turned white 500 msec prior to the 
presentation of the memory set. The four memory set items, printed in lowercase font, 
then appeared for 1,200 msec. The retention interval varied randomly between 3,000 and 
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4,000 msec, during which the participants completed the math verification distractor task. 
The math equation was displayed for 3,000 msec, appearing randomly 0, 150, 250, or 500 
msec following the offset of the memory set. The participants made a left-handed button-
press response to indicate whether the math equation was solved correctly or incorrectly. 
A fixation cross appeared during the portion of the retention interval not occupied by the 
math equation (0, 150, 250, or 500 msec). Next, the probe word appeared in capital letters 
at the center of the screen. Using their right hand, the participants pressed one button to 
indicate that the probe word had appeared in the memory set, disregarding case, and 
another button if it had not. A black fixation cross appeared during the inter-trial interval, 
which varied randomly between 1,500 and 2,000 msec. The participants were instructed 
to respond as accurately as possible on the math verification task and to respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible on the item recognition task. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Mean accuracy on the math task was 0.81 (SE = .02). Mean probe accuracy and 
RTs for each probe type were compared using paired t tests. Significant values are 
reported after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, unless otherwise noted. 
Effect sizes for correlated designs were computed using original standard deviations for 
each condition mean (Dunlop, Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996).  
Our primary comparisons of interest were the accuracy and RT differences 
between negative probes and lures. Table 1 shows the proportion of yes responses for 
each probe type. The participants were nearly twice as likely to falsely recognize lure 
probes than negative probes as members of the memory set, and this difference was 
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significant [t(23) =3.43, p < .01, d = .82]. The participants were more accurate in 
responding to positive (correct yes responses) versus lure probes (correct no responses) 
[t(23) = 2.34, p < .05, d = .58]. There was no accuracy difference between responses to 
positive and negative probes [t(23) = 0.98, n.s.]. Mean correct RTs for negative, lure, and 
positive probe trials are displayed in Figure 1A. RTs for lure probes were significantly 
longer than those for both negative probes [t(23) = 5.04, p < .001, d = .70] and positive 
probes [t(23) = 4.17, p < .001, d = .75]. No reliable differences were observed between 
RTs to positive and negative nonrelated probes [t(23) = 0.30, n.s.], indicating that the 
participants were equally fast in correctly rejecting negative probes and correctly 
recognizing positive probes.  
 
Table 2.1 
Mean proportion of positive, negative and lure probes to which participants 
responded ‘yes’, indicating that the probe was recognized as a member of the 
memory set. Positive probes are those that did appear in the memory set. Negative 
probes were not members of the memory set, nor were they semantically related to 
memorized items. Lure probes were not present in the memory set but were 
semantically related to items in that set. In both experiments, lures were falsely 
recognized significantly more often than negative probes. 
 
In this experiment, the three probe types occurred equally often. Consequently, 
completely accurate performance required negative responses on two thirds of the trials, 
which could lower the accuracy for positive probes. To reduce this no bias and to ensure 
that any such bias did not contribute to our false recognition effects, 18 new participants 
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performed a similar experiment in which there were equal numbers of yes and no trials.  
Positive probe recognition was higher, and accuracy and RT differences between lures 
and negative probes remained highly significant1. The subsequent recognition experiment 
(2A) used an equal distribution of probe types because this design is more efficient for 
examining false recognition errors. 
 
Figure 2.1 
Mean response times (RTs, in milliseconds) for correct responses to positive, 
negative, and lure probes in Experiment 1A, distraction (A) and Experiment 2A, 
no distraction (B). The semantic interference effects, defined as the RT 
difference for correct rejections of lures versus unrelated negative probes, were 
134 and 166 msec for Experiments 1A and 2A, respectively. 
                                                 
1 Mean recognition accuracy was .86 (SE = .02), .93 (SE = .01), and .77 (SE = .04) for positive, negative, 
and lure probes, respectively. Mean RT for correct trials was 796.31 msec (SE = 30.13) for positive probes, 
810.57 msec (SE = 30.02) for negative probes, and 982.44 msec (SE = 40.40) for lure probes. Mean 
accuracy and RT differences between lures and negative probes were significant [t(17) = 4.24, p < .01, d = 




 False recognition of semantically related lures is well documented in episodic 
memory. Experiment 1A demonstrated that this effect can occur on the timescale of a 
working memory task. However, in the long-term memory domain, false memories also 
manifest as semantic intrusions in free recall. The following experiment demonstrated 





The participants were 18 new right-handed University of Michigan students (9 of 
them male; mean age = 19.83 years). 
Materials and Procedure 
This experiment used the same 48 four-item lists as those utilized in Experiment 
1A, except that theme words were never presented as memoranda. No theme or 
memorandum was ever repeated. Each memory set appeared for 1,200 msec, followed by 
a 3- to 4-sec retention interval during which the participants completed the math 
distractor task described above. Next, a prompt appeared instructing the participants to 
say the words from the memory set aloud, in any order. Vocal responses were recorded 
directly onto the computer hard drive with the use of a standard Labtec microphone and 
HarddiskOgg audio capture software (Copyright 2004 Jan Lellmann/Fridgesoft). The 
recall period was untimed. 
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Results and Discussion 
Recall responses were transcribed and coded manually as either correct or 
incorrect. Incorrect responses were further classified as follows: (1) semantic—that is, the 
word was the theme word for the trial, an associate of that theme (not presented, but 
listed on the original 15-item DRM list from which our 4-item list was created; Roediger 
et al., 2001), or a word judged by two trained coders as being related in meaning to two 
or more items in the memory set; (2) phonological (the word sounded like 1 or more 
items in the memory set and was not a semantic associate of the theme word); or (3) 
other, a category that included both repeated (correct or incorrect) responses and recalled 
words that were related in neither meaning nor sound to those in the memory set. Note 
that semantic errors were classified conservatively, in that words associated with only 
one member of a memory set and words that did not meet the criteria for any category 
(approximately 2% of the errors) were omitted from analysis.  Nonword and 
unintelligible utterances (approximately 4% of the errors) were also omitted. 
The participants correctly recalled an average of 3.22 words per trial (SE = 0.10). 
Mean recall errors by error type are displayed in Figure 2A. The main effect for error 
type was significant [F(2,34) =15.33, p<.001, η2 =.47]. The participants made more 
semantic than phonological recall errors [t(17) = 4.56, p < .01, d = 1.36]. In fact, the 
participants made more than twice as many semantic errors as all other error types 
combined, and this difference was reliable [t(17) = 3.37, p < .01, d = 0.77]. Of all the 
responses coded as semantic errors, 66% consisted of the theme word associated with the 
memory set, and 18% were nonpresented (semantically associated) items from the 
original DRM lists. Mean recall positions for semantic, phonological, and other errors 
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were 3.01 (SE =0.14), 2.46 (SE =0.24), and 2.75 (SE=0.27), respectively, which were not 
significantly different. Mean math accuracy was .81 (SE=02). 
 
Figure 2.2 
Mean number of semantic, phonological, and other recall errors in Experiment 1B, 





Experiments 1A and 1B demonstrate that false recognition and false recall errors 
can occur with a 4-item memory set retained over a 3- to 4- second interval. Furthermore, 
lure probes that were correctly rejected produced longer RTs than correct rejections of 
negative unrelated probes, consistent with the possibility of semantic interference. 
These rapid semantic distortions were evident in a working memory task when the 
retention interval was filled with distraction. The completion of a math verification task 
while holding words in memory is also required in the operation span task (Turner & 
Engle, 1989), which is widely used as a measure of working memory capacity (see e.g., 
Reuter-Lorenz & Jonides, 2007). The use of this sort of distracter task during short-term 
retention, therefore, has a strong precedence in the working memory literature (Miyake & 
Shah, 1999).  
However, the math verification requirement presumably interfered with subvocal 
rehearsal of list items, and may have encouraged the use of episodic memory processes. 
If true, then omitting the distracter task should permit verbatim retention of 4 items for 4 
seconds and possibly eliminate the disproportional incidence of false memory errors.   
Experiments 2A and 2B respectively examine the extent to which false recognition and 
recall occur when the math verification task is omitted.   If false memories persist in the 
absence of distraction, then these errors cannot be simply attributed to the disruption of 





Twenty-five new right-handed University of Michigan students (12 of them male; 
mean age = 20.3 years) participated.  
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment was the same as Experiment 1A, except that the math verification 
task was omitted. To better equate the perceptual and response demands of the two 
experiments, a row of empty boxes appeared in place of the math problem during the 
retention interval; the participants were required to make a left-handed button press 
response to the onset of the boxes. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Mean proportions of yes responses for each probe type are shown in Table 1. As 
in Experiment 1A, there was a significant false memory effect, in that the participants 
were more likely to falsely recognize lure probes than negative probes as members of the 
memory set [t(24) = 3.13, p <.01, d= 0.79]. Accuracy for positive and negative probes 
did not differ [t(24) < 2.24, n.s.]. 
 In order to further examine the effects of distraction, 2 X 2 mixed participants 
ANOVAs were performed to compare accuracy and RT (correct trials) for negative and 
lure probes with and without distraction. The results showed main effects of distraction 
on both probe accuracy [F(1,47) =29.91, p< .001, η2 = .39] and RT [F(1,47) =19.73, p < 
.001, η2 = .30], indicating that the presence of distraction reliably decreased accuracy and 
lengthened RT. There were no interactions between probe type and distraction on either 
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dependent measure, indicating that the false recognition and semantic interference effects 





The participants were 20 new right-handed University of Michigan students (11 
of them male; mean age= 18.75 years). 
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment was the same as Experiment 1B, except that the math verification 
task was omitted and replaced with the simple key press to the onset of boxes, as in 
Experiment 2A. 
Results and Discussion 
Recall responses were transcribed and coded manually as either correct or 
incorrect. Incorrect responses were further classified as semantic, phonological, or other, 
as described in Experiment 1B. The error-coding criteria were the same as those used in 
Experiment 1B. Six percent of the errors that did not meet the criteria for any error 
category and another 6% that were nonwords and unintelligible utterances were omitted 
from the analysis. 
The participants correctly recalled an average of 3.51 words per trial (SE=0.06). 
Mean recall errors by error type are displayed in Figure 2B. The main effect for error 
type was significant [F(2,38)=11.27, p < .001, η2=.37]. The participants made more than 
twice as many semantic as phonological recall errors [t(19)=3.89, p < .01, d=1.26]. As in 
 30 
Experiment 1B, the participants made more semantic errors than all other error types 
combined, and this difference was reliable [t(19) = 3.01, p < .05, d = 0.86]. Of all the 
responses coded as semantic errors, 46% consisted of the theme word associated with the 
memory set, and 24% were nonpresented items from the original DRM lists (Roediger et 
al., 2001). Mean recall positions for semantic, phonological, and other errors were 2.93 
(SE = 0.16), 2.34 (SE = 0.23), and 2.76 (SE = 0.21), respectively, and these did not differ 
reliably. 
A post hoc independent samples t test compared recall accuracy with and without 
distraction. As was expected, recall accuracy was higher when no distraction was 
presented during the retention interval [t=2.56, p < .05, d=0.82]. In order to further 
examine the effects of distraction, a 2 X 2 mixed participants ANOVA compared the rate 
of recall errors (semantic, phonological, and other) with and without distraction. The 
results showed a main effect of error type [F(2,72)=26.95, p < .01, η2=.43], reflecting the 
prevalence of semantic errors, and a marginal error type x distraction interaction 
[F(2,72)=3.11, p=.051, η2=.08]. Examination of the means (Figure 2B) suggests a trend 
toward an increase in semantic and other errors in the presence of distraction and a 
relatively stable rate of phonological errors. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the present research, we investigated the occurrence of false memory effects in 
the working memory domain and demonstrated two robust phenomena: First, 
semantically related lures were falsely recognized and falsely recalled a mere 3–4 sec 
following study. False recognition effects occurred reliably whether or not the retention 
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interval was filled with a distracting task. The recall results from Experiment 2B are 
particularly striking, in that semantic intrusions were prevalent after a brief retention 
interval during which the participants were free to engage in subvocal rehearsal. These 
false recall errors indicate that short-term memory distortions do not require the 
presentation of a semantically associated lure probe or the completion of a distractor task 
during the retention interval. 
 Second, salient interference is evident in the RTs for correct rejections of 
semantically related probes. As compared with unrelated probes, semantic associates took 
well over 100 msec longer to reject, whether the retention interval was filled or unfilled. 
 The present research introduces a procedure for generating reliable false memory 
errors within the temporal and set size parameters characteristic of working memory. The 
use of four associated memoranda distinguishes this work from previous investigations in 
which false recognition effects were less robust. For example, in a relatively recent item 
recognition study, Bartha et al. (1998) used memory sets of four unassociated items. As 
compared with the present results, the false recognition effects in Bartha et al. were 
weaker (Experiment 3) and did not replicate in a second experiment (Experiment 4). 
 To what extent might the present results be due to strategic processes that 
participants adopt to contend with task demands? In recognition (Experiments 1A and 
2A), might participants adopt a liberal response bias to lure probes, as in Miller and 
Wolford’s (1999; cf. Roediger & McDermott, 1999) account of false recognition effects 
in the long-term memory domain? This explanation assumes that participants shift their 
response criteria on a trial-by-trial basis, an assumption that does not hold for all 
circumstances (e.g., Wixted & Stretch, 2000) but may be more likely with only a single 
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recognition test per list. However, in earlier versions of our short-term recognition task 
(Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2005), we presented three sets of four different associates from 
the same original DRM lists, thus probing the same list in consecutive test blocks. The 
false memory effect in these versions of the task was as robust as the effects we report 
here. These observations cannot definitively rule out the possibility that criterion shifts 
contribute to the rapid false recognition effects reported here; however, they do weaken 
this account as the sole source of the memory illusion we observe. 
 A strategy-based explanation of our false recall results also deserves 
consideration. In particular, participants could be treating the free recall task 
(Experiments 1B and 2B) like a forced recall task in which they are required to generate 
four responses on every trial. False recall in the long-term memory domain is greater for 
forced than for free recall (see, e.g., McKelvie, 2001; Meade & Roediger, 2006). Our 
instructions, however, did not emphasize the requirement to recall four items, nor did the 
participants feel compelled to do so, as is evident from their average recall of 3.50 and 
3.75 items in Experiments 1A and 2A, respectively. Nevertheless, when the participants 
remembered fewer than four items, their metaknowledge about the relatedness of the lists 
may have led them to interrogate semantic memory in search of an appropriate response. 
This strategy would predict that semantic errors would be most likely in the fourth 
position. Like other recall errors, the average output position for semantic errors was the 
third (2.92 and 3.01 in Experiments 1A and 2A, respectively). These considerations lead 
us to believe that the false memory effects we observed reveal memory’s extreme 
vulnerability to distortion. 
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 What mechanisms, then, might underlie the robust false memory errors that we 
report? Three distinct hypotheses can be entertained. Common to all of them is the 
assumption that long-term semantic memory is the basic source of associative processing 
that mediates activation of thematically related lures and associates (Roediger et al., 
2001). The accounts differ with respect to whether the mechanisms that access semantic 
codes are (1) intrinsic to working memory, (2) intrinsic to episodic memory, or (3) shared 
and common to both short- and long-term remembering. 
 Despite controversy as to whether there exists a working memory system with 
independent semantic components (e.g., Baddeley, 2003; Haarmann & Usher, 2001; 
Hamilton & Martin, 2005; Shivde & Thompson-Schill, 2004), support for such a system 
comes from behavioral evidence (e.g., Potter, 1993), as well as from neuropsychological 
and neuroimaging results (e.g., Martin et al., 1994; Shivde & Thompson-Schill, 2004), 
indicating that word meanings can be retained over the short-term by working memory 
processes that are independent from phonological and visual codes. According to this 
model, the semantic errors in the present paradigm would arise from similarity-based 
interference during the encoding, maintenance, or retrieval of semantic codes, using a 
working memory subsystem that is specialized for semantics. A somewhat weaker form 
of this hypothesis may not require an entirely separable semantic working memory 
subsystem. For example, the episodic buffer, as proposed by Baddeley (2000), is a slave 
system to working memory’s central executive that is separate from long-term memory 
and that contains multidimensional representations of information gathered from several 
sources, including long-term episodic memory, as well as the phonological and 
visuospatial buffers. 
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 The second hypothesis follows from the view that although semantic errors in the 
present paradigm occur in the context of a working memory task, deeper semantic coding 
is the sole province of episodic memory processes that are operating in parallel with 
working memory. According to this view, short- and long-term false memories differ 
only in time course and are mediated by identical psychological processes. Phonological 
representations of the memoranda are maintained in working memory; however, false 
memories arise from episodic memory processes that are responsible for generating 
semantic distortions at longer delays (i.e., associative and monitoring processes operating 
during encoding and retrieval; see, e.g., Roediger et al., 2001). According to this view, 
the false memories that we observed are a product of long-term memory contributions to 
working memory. 
 The third hypothesis is that the false memory errors that we observe arise from 
processes that are shared by both short- and long-term remembering (see, e.g., Nairne, 
2002, for a review). The model proposed by Cowan (1999) fits best in this class of 
hypotheses, in that long-term memory is postulated to provide the representational basis 
for short-term remembering. According to this view, short-term memory provides the 
activation processes that select and maintain the relevant portion of long-term memory, in 
a manner resembling extended priming. The unitary model proposed by Nairne (e.g., 
2002), in which short-term memory, like episodic memory, is cue based, also falls into 
this third type of account. According to Nairne’s feature model, what is retained over the 
short or long-term is not a set of particular items but, rather, a constellation of cues that 
include phonological, lexical, and semantic features. At retrieval, these cues are used to 
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reconstruct the memoranda. Accurate memory requires distinctive cues, thereby leading 
to the detrimental effects of phonological, as well as semantic, similarity. 
 Determining which of these hypotheses offers the best account of the false 
memory errors we observe will depend on future research. We note, however, that the 
present results demonstrate a striking parallel in the memory distortions that can affect 
both recognition and recall over the short or long-term. This convergence is consistent 
with the growing body of evidence indicating overlap between short- and long-term 
memory mechanisms (Cabeza et al., 2002; Karlsgodt et al., 2005; Ranganath et al., 2003; 
see also Baddeley, 2000; Cowan, 1999). Theoretical models that may best account for our 
findings, therefore, are ones that emphasize an integration of short- and long-term 
memory processes (the third type of hypothesis outlined above). 
 A second theoretical question posed by the present research relates to the 
psychological mechanisms underlying the observed interference effect. Lures took longer 
to correctly reject than did negative probes. The semantic relatedness of the lure item to 
the memory set presumably necessitated recruitment of additional processes, thereby 
increasing RT. What might these additional processes be? One possibility is that semantic 
relatedness increased the familiarity of the lure item, making it more difficult to reject 
than an item that had not been recently active in working memory. This need to 
adjudicate between an item’s heightened familiarity and its status as a member of the 
current memory set is very similar to explanations offered to account for familiarity-
based proactive interference effects that occur across trials in short-term item recognition 
paradigms (Jonides, Smith, Marshuetz, Koeppe, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998; Monsell, 1978). 
The increased RTs for lures could also stem from invoking source memory to decide 
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whether the lure was actually presented or whether it was merely thought of due to strong 
associations with the memory set (e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Source 
memory and the need for increased contextual coding have also been linked to 
familiarity-based proactive interference in short-term item recognition tasks (Badre & 
Wagner, 2005; Jonides & Nee, 2006). 
 We are currently using fMRI to investigate the possibility that common prefrontal 
mechanisms mediate semantic and familiarity-based interference effects (Atkins, Walsh, 
& Reuter-Lorenz, 2006). This ongoing neuroimaging research may also prove 
indispensable in distinguishing among the theoretical accounts of false working memory, 
in that it will allow us to examine the overlap and dissociations between the neural 
correlates of false short- and long-term remembering. 
 Taken together, our findings present strong evidence that semantic distortions of 
memory can occur over the very short-term and reveal a surprising fallibility of verbatim 
memory processes. In mere seconds following presentation of a small memory set, 
participants falsely recall and recognize semantically related lures. Because the contents 
of working memory figure prominently in reasoning and problem-solving abilities, rapid 
distortions of meaning that go unchecked could have considerable impact on the quality 
of our decisions and the accuracy of our solutions. From a theoretical perspective, the 
data we report converge with a number of recent findings demonstrating considerable 
overlap in the operations and mechanisms of episodic and working memory (e.g., Cabeza 
et al., 2002; Nairne, 2002; Ranganath et al., 2003; Wagner, 1999; see also, Karlsgodt et 
al., 2005). False recognition and false recall may, therefore, constitute a valuable new 
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NEURAL MECHANISMS OF SEMANTIC INTERFERENCE AND 
VULNERABILITY TO FALSE RECOGNITION IN SHORT-TERM MEMORY 
 
Introduction 
Distortions of memory have been a subject of interest for cognitive psychology 
since its inception.  One reason for this is that examination of the circumstances under 
which our memories fail us can illuminate our understanding of how memory is 
organized.  In the last two decades, the term false memory has come to describe instances 
in which episodic memories become distorted, leading to false recognition and recall of 
previously unstudied items.  In the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM; Deese, 1959; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995) paradigm, participants study lists of 12 -15 words which 
are all related in meaning to a common unstudied theme word, or lure.  At test, 
participants are required to either recognize studied items from a list of probes that 
includes unstudied lure words, or to recall studied items in free report.  Investigations 
using variants of this procedure have shown that participants consistently and confidently 
recognize unstudied lures, and even produce these items in free recall (see Gallo, 2006 
for review).  
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Although initial investigations of the false memory phenomena were limited to 
paradigms which included long study lists and retention intervals that varied from several 
seconds to many hours, there is recent evidence that false memories are produced rapidly, 
within the time and load constraints of traditionally defined short-term memory tasks 
(Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2005; Coane, McBride, Raulerson, & Jordan, 2007; Atkins & 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2008).  For example, using a short-term variation of the DRM (ST-DRM) 
paradigm, we recently demonstrated reliable false recognition and recall of unstudied 
lures only 4 seconds following encoding (Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008).  Furthermore, 
in the recognition version of our task, we found strong evidence that the semantic 
relationship between lure probes and memoranda induced interference even when lures 
were not falsely recognized.  
The increased time required to reject lure probes is consistent with the notion that 
correct rejection of these items requires engagement in a controlled process which can 
resolve interference induced by the semantic familiarity of these items. When 
interference resolution is successful, the lure probe can be correctly rejected.  False 
recognition of these items could indicate either a failure of this controlled process, or a 
failure to engage it at all.  
Interestingly, false recognition has not been widely investigated as a failure of 
cognitive control processes.  One reason for this is the paucity of crosstalk between those 
investigating false memory in the episodic domain, and those investigating interference 
resolution in short-term memory.  Interference resolution processes in short-term memory 
have been studied extensively using the recent probes (RP) task (Monsell, 1978; Jonides, 
Smith, Marshuetz, Koeppe, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998). In this task, participants study a set 
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of 4-6 memoranda.  Following a brief retention interval, a probe item is presented that 
requires a Y/N recognition response.  Generally, 4 probes types are employed.  Items that 
require a ‘No” response include recent negative (RN) probes that are not present on the 
current trial, but were members in the memory set on the trial immediately preceding the 
current one, and non-recent negative (NRN) probes that are not members of the current 
set and have not appeared for the last several trials.  Items requiring a ‘Yes’ response 
include standard positive (POS) probes are members of the current memory set, and 
recent positive (RPOS) that appeared as memoranda on both the current and immediately 
preceding trial.   
Behaviorally, findings from RP tasks consistently show that participants are 
markedly slower in rejecting RN relative to NRN probes, suggesting that the episodic 
familiarity of the RN probes makes it more difficult to correctly reject.  The source of this 
slowing has been interpreted as the need to engage in an interference resolution process 
by which the temporal familiarity of the RN item can be adjudicated in the service of 
accurate recognition memory.  The neural circuitry subserving this interference resolution 
has been a topic of numerous neuroimaging investigations that have high-lighted an 
important role for left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (L VLPFC) in this process.  Probe-
related increases for RN relative to NRN probes have been shown and replicated across a 
variety of RP tasks (see Jonides & Nee, 2006 for review).  Furthermore, behavioral 
indices of proactive interference (PI) in this task, calculated as RT difference between 
correct responses to RN relative to NRN probes, have shown positive correlations with 
increases in L VLPFC activity (Badre & Wagner, 2005; Jonides & Nee, 2006; Badre & 
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Wagner, 2007), indicating that increased interference is associated with increased activity 
in this region. 
The importance of L VLPFC in familiarity-based interference is further 
demonstrated by findings examining age differences in PI in short-term memory, and by 
patient studies. For instance, Jonides et al. (2000) showed that older subjects who showed 
increased PI effects failed to exhibit increased activation of left BA45.  Patients with 
focal lesions to this region also show increased PI (Thompson-Schill, et al., 1999, see 
also Hamilton & Martin, 2005), suggesting that engagement of L VLPFC may be 
necessary for the timely resolution of this form of interference.  
Increased activity in L VLPFC regions has also been linked to interference 
resolution in paradigms other than the RP task, including tasks requiring semantic 
selection (Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997; Hirshorn & Thompson-
Schill, 2004; see also Poldrack, Wagner, Prull, Desmond, et al., 1999; Gold & Buckner, 
2002).  In the Verb Generate task, for instance, participants are asked to mentally 
generate a verb corresponding to a noun which is presented to them in the scanner.   For 
example, given the noun SCISSORS, a participant may generate the response ‘CUT’.  
Results from such investigations have shown increased L VLPFC activity and increased 
RT associated with the requirement to generate verbs in response to nouns that have 
many associated verbs (for example, ‘BALL’) than those that have few (for example 
‘SCISSORS’; Thompson-Schill, et al., 1997; Nelson, Reuter-Lorenz, Persson, Sylvester, 
& Jonides, 2009).    
Thus, converging evidence suggests that regions of L VLPFC play a role in 
familiarity-induced interference and in semantic selection processes.  It follows that this 
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region may also mediate semantic interference in our ST-DRM task.  In this paradigm, 
correct rejection of lure probes requires participants to overcome the interference induced 
by semantic, rather than temporal familiarity, as in the RP task.   
A primary goal of the present study is to investigate the role of L VLPFC in SI, 
and to determine the extent to which it can be dissociated from other forms of familiarity-
based interference. One interpretation of L VLPFC’s role in interference resolution across 
tasks is that this region selects between activated representations in memory (Thompson-
Schill, et al., 1997).  By one account, this selection process weighs evidence in 
supporting possible responses by comparing activations of stimulus attributes relevant to 
task performance (Badre & Wagner, 2007).  Relevant stimulus features will vary from 
task to task, and could included semantic, phonological and episodic contextual cues.  
The greater the overlap between the features activated by probes in an item-recognition 
task and memorized items, the longer the selection process should take.  For instance, RN 
probes, which have become active due to recent study, will be more difficult to reject 
than NRN probes that have less residual episodic activation, and therefore will induce 
increased L VLPFC activation.  Similarly, lure probes in our ST-DRM task should show 
increased L VLPFC activation relative to unrelated negative probes due to the overlap of 
the semantic properties of these lures and memoranda.  
A second aim of the present investigation is to examine veridical versus false 
retrieval from short-term memory.  By examining cases in which interference resolution 
is unsuccessful (i.e. when lures are falsely recognized) we may be able to assess the 
extent to which regions including L VLPFC underlie these effects.  One possibility is that 
false recognition will be associated with a failure to activate L VLPFC.  Another 
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possibility is that L VLPFC may interact with other regions that mediate interference 
indexed by the L VLPFC in service of accurate memory.  In this case, L VLPFC may not 
distinguish between trials in which interference is ultimately overcome (correct rejections 
of lure) from those in which it is not (false alarms to lures), but regions that support 
accurate recognition in the face of interference should.  What might these additional 
regions be?  One candidate proposed by Badre and Wagner (2005) is left frontopolar 
cortex (FPC), a region associated with episodic retrieval that showed increased activation 
associated with correct recognition in the face of PI in their task.  Another candidate is 
the right posterior parietal cortex, which has shown increased activity in response to 
correct rejection of lure vs. unrelated probes in an episodic DRM paradigm (McDermott, 
Jones, Petersen, Lageman, & Roediger, 2000), and which is associated with source 
memory, attentional maintenance of task goals, and memory retrieval in the face of 
distraction (Cabeza, Ciaramelli, Olson, & Moscovitch, 2008; Ciaramelli, Grady, & 
Moscovitch, 2008; Singh-Curry & Husain, 2009).   
The present experiment was designed to distinguish between these possibilities, 
and to assess the neural mechanisms associated with SI and memory distortions in the 
ST-DRM paradigm.  We first identify and discuss regions associated with interference 
and veridical vs. false retrieval from short-term memory using whole-brain assessments 
of probe-related differences between trial types in our ST-DRM paradigm.  Next, we 
examine brain-behavior relationships in frontal and parietal regions of interest (ROIs), 
and suggest a distinction between regions that respond to SI and those that support 







Twenty participants (12 females; mean age=20) were recruited from the 
University of Michigan.  All participants gave informed consent as reviewed by the 
university’s Institutional Review Board. Participants were paid $20 per hour for their 
participation. 
 
Task and Procedure 
 Participants completed the short-term DRM paradigm (ST-DRM; Atkins & 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2008) during 9 task runs (Figure 3.1). At the beginning of each trial, a 
blinking red fixation appeared for 500ms to warn the participant the trial was beginning.  
This was followed by a memory set consisting of 4 semantically related items, all 
associated with a common theme word.  The memory set appeared for 1200ms.  Five 
hundred ms following the offset of the memory items, a dual-operation math equation 
appeared at the center of the screen.  This equations was solved either correctly for 
example, (4 X 3) – 2 = 10?, or incorrectly, and participants made a left-handed response 
to indicate whether the math was correct or incorrect.  Five hundred ms following the 
offset of the math problem, a memory probe appeared and participants made a right-
handed Y/N response indicating whether or not the probe was a member of the memory 
set.  
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During this task, theme words served as the probes on all the trials. There were 
two variations of “No” trials.  The first were unrelated negative (NEG) trials, in which  
the probe consisted of the theme word associated with a nonpresented list.  The second 
were lure (LURE) trials, in which the probe consisted of the (unstudied) theme associated 
with the present memory set.  On positive (POS) trials, the associated theme was 
embedded in the memory set, and served as the positive probe.   
 
Figure 3.1.  
Example trials from the ST-DRM task. Positive probes (POS) are those that did appear in the 
memory set.  LURE probes did not appear, but were semantically associated theme words related 
to items in the current memory set. Unrelated negative (NEG) probes did not appear, and were 
unrelated in meaning to items in the memory set.   
 
 
With the exception of positive probes, no participant was exposed to any theme or 
memoranda more than once during the experiment.  Backward associative strength 
(BAS), a measure of the degree of association between theme words and memoranda (see 
Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001; Hancock & Hicks, 2002), was equated 
across memory lists associated with each probe type, and probe type was counterbalanced 
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with lists across participants.  This procedure ensured that participants encountered the 
same probes, all theme words, but in different contexts, as lures, unrelated negative 
probes, or positive probes. Trials were presented in random order for each participant.  
 Participants completed 102 ST-DRM trials which were distributed across 6 task 
runs.  Trials were equally distributed across all three probe-types in each run.  Because 
we were interested in examining responses to false alarms to lure probes in addition to 
hits and correct rejections, we used a long 16sec ITI to allow for the hemodynamic 
response to return to baseline between trials (Glover, 1999).  All participants completed 2 
practice runs prior to entering the scanner, in order to become familiar with task and 
response demands.  
 
FMRI Data Acquisition 
 Our data were collected using a 3-T GE whole-body scanner equipped with a 
standard quadrature headcoil.  A spiral sequence was used to collect Functional T2* 
blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) images with 25 contiguous axial 5-mm 
slices.  Our repetition time (TR) = 2000 ms, flip angle = 90, and field of view (FOV) = 24 
cm. T1-weighted gradient echo (GRE) anatomical image was also acquired in the same 
FOV and slices as were used in the functional data collection.  A high-resolution (60 
slice) set of anatomical images was acquired via spoiled gradient-recalled acquisition in 
steady state (SPGR) imaging. 
 
FMRI Data Analysis 
 
Neuroimaging analyses were conducted using the General Linear Model 
implemented in SPM5 with separate regressors for each trial type in each run. Functional 
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and anatomical images were normalized to MNI space, and functional images were 
smoothed (8mm Gaussian kernel).  Event-related activity to probes was modeled by 
convolving probe onsets with the canonical HRF. Statistical models were estimated for 
each participant.  For each comparison of interest, contrast maps for each participant 
were submitted to random effects comparisons.  
 
Behavioral Results 
 Behavioral findings replicate the SI and false memory effects demonstrated 
previously (Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008).  Mean accuracy and response time (correct 
trials only) measures were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA).  There were main effects of probe type (positive, negative, lure) on both 
accuracy, F=16.98, p<.001, η2=.47 and RT, F=37.22, p<.001, η2=.66.  Post-hoc tests 
were conducted to examine false memory and semantic interference effects, and were 
submitted to a Bonferonni correction for multiple comparisons.   
Table 3.1 shows the proportion of items recognized for each probe type. We 
found a reliable false memory effect, with participants falsely recognizing lure items at a 
rate over four times that for negative unrelated probes, t=6.01,p<.001, d=1.54.  Mean RTs 
for both correct trials and false alarms (FAs) to lure items are displayed in Fig. 3.2. 
Participants were reliably slower to correctly reject lure probes, as compared to negative 
unrelated probes, t=8.10, p<.001, d=.86.  Our SI index, measured as the difference in RT 




Table 3.1.  
Mean proportion of positive, negative, and lure probes to which participants responded 
‘Yes’. 
 
Probe Type Proportion of Yes responses 
 
 M SE 
POS .89 .02 
NEG .03 .01 
LURE .13 .02 
 
Note- A ‘Yes’ response indicates that the probe was recognized as a member of the 
current memory set.  The proportion recognized therefore represents the hit rate for 
POS probes, and the false recognition rate for NEG and LURE probes. The mean false 
memory rate, defined as the difference between false recognition for NEG and LURE 
probes was .10 (SE=.01). 
 
 
We used paired-tests to compare RTs associated false recognition (false alarms to 
lures) to those associated with true recognition (hits to positive probes).  False 
recognition of lures was reliably slower than true recognition (t=4.40, p<.001, d=1.02).  
Furthermore, RTs associated with false recognition vs. correct rejections of lures did not 
differ reliably, indicating that false recognition did not occur as a consequence of fast 
responding. 
 
Figure 3.2.  
Mean response times for correct recognition of Positive probes (hits), correct 
rejections (CR) of Negative and Lure probes, and false alarms (FA) to Lure probes. 
The mean semantic interference effect, defined as the difference in time required to 




Neuroimaging Results  
Whole-Brain Analysis 
 Results from our whole-brain analyses are presented in Table 2, and summarized 
below.  Unless otherwise stated all comparisons reported were significant at p<.005, 
uncorrected, with threshold requirement of 20 or more contiguous voxels (Forman, 
Cohen, Fitzgerald, Eddy, et al., 1995). 
 In order to examine the neural mechanisms associated with SI in the ST-DRM 
task, we identified regions that showed increased probe-related activity in response to 
correctly rejected lure probes, relative to correctly rejected negative probes.  In both 
cases, correct ‘No’ responses are made to unstudied items, but in the case of a lure probe 
SI is present, whereas in the case of a negative unrelated probe, no interference should be 
present. This comparison is thus directly analogous to the recent vs. non-recent negative 
probe comparisons used in investigations of PI using the RP task.   
Figure 3.3 displays regions that showed activity that was greater for correct 
rejections of lure vs. negative probes.  These included a large cluster of voxels in left 
mid-VLPFC, with a single peak in BA45.  This suggests, consistent with predictions, that 
L VLPFC is recruited in response to interference from unstudied items that are 
semantically associated with items in memory.  Bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, 
BA24/32) also distinguished lures from negative probes.  Given strong evidence 




Table 3.2.  





(e.g. Nelson, Reuter-Lorenz, Sylvester, Jonides, & Smith, 2003), involvement of this 
region most likely reflects the need to forgo a ‘yes’ response to a probe that is familiar in 
favor of a correct ‘no’ response.  Finally, we also found increased bilateral IPS activity in 
response to lure items, consistent with McDermott et al.’s (2001) examination of this 
contrast in a standard DRM task.  The role of PPC in SI and source memory is further 
discussed in our ROI analysis of this region. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.   
Regions showing increased activity for correct rejection of lure vs. unrelated negative 
probes.  As predicted, we found a large cluster of activation in L VLPFC associated 
with semantic interference.  The peak of this activity, -48 21 21, was somewhat 
superior to those generally reported in tasks that examine proactive interference in the 
RP task (see text).  
 
We examined neural mechanisms of true and false memory by first identifying 
regions associated with true and false recognition separately.  For true recognition, we 
compared correct recognition of positive probes to correct rejections of unrelated 
negative probes (Pos. Hit > Neg. CR).  For false recognition, we compared false alarms 
to lure probes to correct rejections of unrelated negative probes (Lure FA>Neg. CR).   
True recognition was associated with increased activity a predictable network of 
fronto-parietal regions consistently associated with retrieval from verbal short-term 
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memory (Cohen, Perlstein, Braver, Nystrom, et al., 1997; D'Esposito, Postle, & Rypma, 
1998; Rypma & D'Esposito, 1999; Chein & Fiez, 2001; Bedwell, Horner, Yamanaka, Li, 
et al., 2005).  Most notably, these included large increases of activation in left anterior 
prefrontal/ dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 10/46) and bilateral inferior parietal 
cortices (BA 40).  False recognition showed a similar pattern of fronto-parietal activation, 
as well as a large cluster of activation in left posterior cingulate/ retrosplenial cortex, a 
region previously linked to phenomenological feelings of remembering that may be 
independent of retrieval accuracy (Wagner, Shannon, Kahn, & Buckner, 2005). 
We examined regions that distinguished true from false recognition by directly 
contrasting activation associated with correct recognition of positive probes and false 
recognition of lures (Pos. Hit > Lure FA).  Results are displayed in Figure 3.4. Compared 
with false recognition, true recognition was associated with a large cluster of increased 
activity extending from the left putamen to the anterior bank of the medial temporal lobe.  
We also found increased activation in right VLPFC, a region consistently implicated in 
inhibitory control across a variety of task contexts (Garavan, Ross, & Stein, 1999; 
Chikazoe, Konishi, Asari, Jimura, & Miyashita, 2007; Chikazoe, Jimura, Asari, 
Yamashita, et al., 2009), and in the left fusiform gyrus (see Table 3.2).  Taken together, 
these findings suggest increased sensory processing, as well as the need to exert 
inhibitory control or increased task monitoring in order to support correct recognition of 
studied items in the face of interference. 
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Figure 3.4.  
Regions that dissociate true from false recognition (Pos. Hit>Lure FA).  True 
recognition was associated with increased activity in the left putamen that extended to 
anterior MTL. 
 
Region of interest (ROI) Analyses 
Left mid-Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
 Results from our whole brain analysis supported our hypothesis that L VLPFC 
would contribute to resolving interference from related lures, although our activation 
peak was superior to the BA 45 peak linked to the resolution of PI.  We conducted an 
ROI analysis to determine whether activation in the L VLPFC region associated with PI 
is also relevant for the control of SI.  An ROI was formed by creating a 10mm sphere 
surrounding peak activation reported for the RN>NRN contrast in the RP task (MNI 
peak: -51 21 11; Jonides et al., 1998; Nelson et al., 2003).
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Figure 3.5A plots mean percent signal change in L VLPFC for hits to positive 
probes, correct rejections of negative probes, and both correct rejections and false alarms 
to lure probes.  Results show that activity in this ROI distinguished correctly rejected 
lures and unrelated negative probes, t=2.5, p<.05, d=.45. Furthermore, change in L 
VLPFC activity was strongly and positively correlated with individual differences in SI, 
r=.67, p<.01, (Figure 3.5B).  This positive correlation between L VLPFC activity and SI 
is the same as that reported in the recent probes task (Jonides & Nee, 2006) 2. 
We also found increased L VLPFC activation for lures that were falsely 
recognized, as compared to correctly rejected unrelated negative probes, suggesting that 
L VLPFC may be similarly recruited in response to SI, even when this interference is not 
successfully resolved.  We can rule out the interpretation that L VLPFC is simply 
responding to the presence of semantic familiarity rather than interference per say, by 
examining activation associated with positive probes.  Positive probes in our task are 
those that were studied in the context of a list of associated items, and should therefore be 
both semantically and episodically familiar, though this familiarity should not induce 
interference since it is consistent with a veridical recognition.  If L VLPFC activity 
simply signaled the presence of familiarity, we would then expect increased activation in 
response to positive as well as lure probes.  This is not the case, however, as probe-
related activity did not differ for positive and unrelated negative probes in this region 
(p>.8).  
                                                 
2  We also examined the correlation between individual variations in SI and changes in L VLPFC activity 
in a 10mm sphere surrounding our whole brain peak for the semantic interference contrast (-48 21 21).  For 
this ROI, we found a similar, though slightly weaker, positive correlation between increased activity for 





Figure 3.5.   
Mean percent signal change (PSC) in our L VLPFC ROI displayed as a function of trial 
type (A).  Individual differences in L VLPFC activity for lure vs. unrelated negative 
probes was positively correlated with the RT index of semantic interference (B). 
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Right Posterior Parietal Cortex 
 
 Recent work has suggested an important role for posterior parietal regions in 
veridical memory processing and attention to task goals (Cabeza, et al., 2008; Ciaramelli, 
et al., 2008; Singh-Curry & Husain, 2009).  Consistent with this assertion, our whole 
brain analysis revealed sites of increased activation in bilateral PPC associated with 
successful resolution of SI.  In order to further examine the role of these parietal sites in 
SI, we examined brain-behavior relationships by correlating our behavioral measure of SI 
with activation changes in bilateral parietal peaks.  ROIs consisted of 10mm spheres 
surrounding peak activations in right IPS (MNI peak: 38 -58 48) and left IPS (MNI peak: 
-34 -65 48).  Results showed a trend toward a negative correlation between changes in 
right PPC activity and individual differences in SI, r =.31, p<.1, suggesting  that subjects 
who showed greater increases in this ROI for lure vs. neg. probes showed less semantic 
interference. No such relationship was found for our left PPC region.  
 In order to further investigate a potential role for R PPC in interference resolution, 
we conducted an exploratory analysis to examine regions that positively correlated with 
activity in our R PPC ROI during successful resolution of SI.  This was achieved by 
correlating activation changes in this region with changes in other regions throughout the 
brain on a voxel by voxel basis for each subject.  Table 3.3 lists regions in which a 
minimum of 20 contiguous voxels were correlated at r=.50 or greater across all 20 
subjects.  High correlations between increases in right PPC activity and increases in 
bilateral fusiform and extrastriate regions are consistent with findings from our whole 
brain analysis of true vs. false memory, which showed large increases in fusiform activity 
associated with veridical recognition.  High correlations were also found with medial 
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frontal regions (BA8) implicated in correct decision making in the face of uncertainty 
(Volz, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2003, 2004; Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2005), and 
with left superior parietal cortex, a region that, together with right IPS has been linked to 
top-down control processes that allow for flexible management of task goals in the face 
of distraction (Ciaramelli, et al., 2008).  Taken together, this correlational analysis 
supports the interpretation that right IPS is part of a network of regions that together work 
to support accurate task performance in the face of interference. 
 
Table 3.3.  
Regions correlated with increases in R PPC activity during successful resolution of SI .  
 
Note- Regions listed contained a minimum of 20 contiguous voxels were correlated at r=.50 or higher 
across all 20 subjects. 
 
Left frontal-polar cortex 
An additional ROI analysis examined differences in a 10mm sphere surrounding 
the L FPC peak (MNI: -33 45 -9) reported by Badre and Wagner (2005).  Activation in 
this region did not distinguish between any probe types in our task, and was not 
correlated with behavioral indices of SI or false memory.  One possibility is that this 
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region, which Badre and Wagner (2005) attributed to episodic monitoring processes, is 
recruited for the resolution of interference due to temporal recency in the RP task, and 
may not be relevant to interference induced by items that have not been studied 
previously.  Another possibility is that the number of trials utilized in the present 
investigation may not have provided us with adequate statistical power to defect probe-
related differences in this region (see Badre & Wagner, 2005). Although we have no 
evidence for a L PFC contribution to SI, we cannot formally rule out this possibility. 
DISCUSSION 
The present study investigated the neural mechanisms of semantic interference 
and false recognition in a short-term variation of the DRM task (Deese, 1959; Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995; Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008).  We examined the neural 
mechanisms of SI by identifying regions that showed increased activation for correct 
rejection of items related in meaning to current memoranda (lures) as compared to 
unrelated negative probes.  In light of past research indicating a role for L VLPFC in 
proactive interference induced by recently studied items (Jonides & Nee, 2006), we 
predicted this region would also be involved in interference induced by the lure items, 
which were never studied but which were semantically familiar.  Consistent with this 
prediction, we found increased L VLPFC (BA45) activity associated with the correct 
rejection of lure vs. unrelated negative probes.  ROI analyses revealed a strong positive 
correlation between individual differences in the magnitude of SI and probe-related 
increases in L VLPFC (see Figure 3.5).  This finding demonstrates that the positive 
relationship between behavioral indices of interference and L VLPFC activity is not 
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unique to temporal familiarity, and suggests that common neural substrates are engaged 
in response to interference induced by either temporal or semantic familiarity.  
Positive correlations between behavioral measures of interference and increased 
activity in L VLPFC could be interpreted as either a) evidence this region is the site of 
interference resolution and therefore must work harder to resolve interference as it 
increases, or b) this region creates an index of interference in the environment that is used 
by other cortical regions in the service of accurate memory retrieval.  We attempted to 
distinguish between these possibilities by comparing L VLPFC activity for lures that 
were ultimately rejected to those that were falsely recognized.  Results showed a similar 
increase in probe-related activity for both correct rejections and false alarms to lures, 
indicating that the L VLPFC responded equivalently to the presence of interference that 
was ultimately resolved successfully, and interference that was not resolved.   
False alarm rates in RP tasks used to investigate the neural mechanisms of PI are 
normally quite low.  As such, these investigations have focused almost exclusively on the 
successful resolution of interference, and have generally interpreted L VLPFC increases 
in this context.  Our findings are consistent with the interpretation that L VLPFC 
responds to the selection demands associated with multiple active representations in 
memory (Thompson-Schill, et al., 1997; Badre & Wagner, 2007), but suggest that the 
region responds equivalently when this selection process is unsuccessful.  
 In comparison to L VLPFC, our exploratory analysis of brain-behavior 
correlations in R PPC showed a marginal negative correlation between changes in 
activation for lure vs. negative probes and reductions in RT measures of semantic 
interference. This region, located along the superior bank of the IPS, has also been 
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implicated in correct rejections of lure vs. unrelated negative probes in an episodic DRM 
task (McDermott, et al., 2000), and in source memory across a variety of tasks (Cabeza, 
et al., 2008; Ciaramelli, et al., 2008; Mitchell & Johnson, 2009).  Furthermore, results 
from our correlational analysis show that increases in R PPC is correlated with increases 
in activity in a number of regions shown to support accurate responding in the face of 
uncertainty and distraction, including bilateral fusiform, medial frontal and left superior 
parietal regions (Table 3.3).   
Our interpretation of R PPC’s role in the current task is consistent with recent 
work suggesting distinct roles for IPS/superior parietal regions, associated with top-down 
attention to memory, and inferior parietal regions, associated with bottom-up attentional 
capture by retrieved memory representations (Ciaramelli, et al., 2008).  The positive 
correlation between activation in our PPC ROI, which lies along the superior boarder of 
the IPS, and decreased vulnerability to false recognition, is consistent with the hypothesis 
that this region mediates top-down control of access to memory representations that may 
help prevent attentional capture by unstudied, but familiar, lures.   
Taken together, our results suggest a possible distinction between roles for L 
VLPFC and R PPC in the resolution of semantic interference.  L VLPFC shows increased 
activation in response to semantic lures, but does not distinguish between lures that are 
ultimately correctly rejected and those that are falsely recognized as studied items.  Our 
finding of negative correlations between R PPC activity and interference suggests this 
region may play a central role in adjudicating the familiarity of lure items in the service 
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Interference is one of the greatest burdens on the cognitive system.  It’s why we 
put the cereal box in the refrigerator when we have an idle thought, but it is also related 
to more serious lapses of attention, which can lead to significant accidents.  Additionally, 
interference has profound adverse affects on short-term memory, and is one of the major 
sources of forgetting in short-term memory (Nairne, 2002; Wixted, 2005; Lewandowsky, 
Geiger, & Oberauer, 2008; Berman, Jonides, & Lewis, 2009). 
To make matters worse, short-term memory is susceptible to multiple forms of 
interference.  Classical investigations demonstrated acoustic and visual similarity 
interference effects both on short-term memory recall and recognition, wherein 
acoustically or visually similar items were incorrectly substituted for memorized items at 
retrieval (Conrad, 1964; Laughery & Harris, 1970; Logie, Della Sala, Wynn, & Baddeley, 
2000).  Early work also established that the semantic context of memoranda lead to a 
build-up of interference.  In classic release from proactive interference (PI) paradigms 
(Wickens, 1970), recall and recognition of items on a current memory set declines as a 
 73 
function of the number previous lists studied from the same category.  When the category 
is changed, PI is eliminated (Kincaid & Wickens, 1970; Wickens, 1970). 
 More recent investigations of PI have highlighted the strong influence of episodic 
familiarity on short-term memory retrieval.  One task used to test the influence of 
proactive interference is the recent probes (RP) task.  In the task (Monsell, 1978; Jonides, 
Smith, Marshuetz, Koeppe, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1998), participants study a set of items that 
are retained for several seconds.  After the retention interval, subjects are presented with 
a probe to which they must make a Y/N response.  Critically, negative probes are of two 
kinds: recent negative (RN) and non-recent negative (NRN).  RN probes are items that 
are not present on the current trial, but were present in the memory set on the trial 
immediately preceding the current one, while NRN items are probes that have not 
appeared on the last several trials.  Investigations of the RP task consistently show that 
participants are markedly slower and more error-prone when rejecting RN relative to 
NRN probes.  These findings have been interpreted as evidence for the need to engage in 
interference resolution, a controlled cognitive process by which the episodic familiarity 
of RN probes is adjudicated in service of veridical retrieval from memory (Jonides & 
Nee, 2006).  
Other recent work has demonstrated semantic interference (SI) in short-term 
memory, wherein correct rejection of unstudied items related in meaning to those in 
memory is slower and more error-prone than rejection of unrelated items (Atkins & 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2008).  In a recent investigation, we used a short-term variant of the 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) to examine 
false memory and semantic interference (Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008).  In this ST-
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DRM task, participants studied sets of 4 words which were all associates of a common 
unstudied theme word.  Following a 3-4 second retention interval, which was either 
unfilled or filled with a math verification task (i.e., a distraction task), participants saw a 
single probe word to which they made a Y/N response to indicate whether the probe was 
a member of the current memory set.  Critically, negative probes were of two kinds: 
unrelated negative (NEG) probes which were not members of the current set and which 
were unrelated in meaning to the memorized items, and related negative (LURE) probes 
which consisted of the unstudied theme associated with items in the current set.   Each 
trial consisted of a memory set associated with a trial-unique theme, with no repetition of 
themes or memoranda across trials.  Findings showed reliable false recognition of lure 
probes, and high levels of interference associated with correct rejection of these items 
relative to unrelated negative probes.  This suggests that like temporal recency, semantic 
context can induce interference in short-term memory. 
The RP and ST-DRM paradigms used to investigate PI and SI respectively, both 
require participants to negotiate the familiarity of critical probe items (RN or LURE 
probes) in service of accurate memory retrieval.  In the first case, RN probes are activated 
due to their recent status as memoranda, while in the second, LURE probes become 
active at encoding via spreading activation through a semantic network (Underwood, 
1965; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Roediger, McDermott, & Robinson, 1998).  One 
possibility is that both the episodic and semantic context of critical probes may promote 
source memory confusion, increasing the likelihood that such probes will be 
misattributed to the current memory set (Nelson, Reuter-Lorenz, Sylvester, Jonides, & 
Smith, 2003).  This account is consistent with feature-based models of memory such as 
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that proposed by Nairne (2002). According to this model, successful memory retrieval 
relies on accurate recombination of activated cues associated with various features of 
memoranda, such as episodic, semantic, lexical and phonological features.  A reduction 
in the distinctiveness of episodic or semantic features that distinguish probes from 
memoranda will induce interference.  Under such circumstances, a similar interference 
resolution process may be required.  When such a process fails, RN or LURE probes will 
be falsely recognized as members of the current memory set; when it succeeds, correct 
rejection of critical probes is slowed due to the need to engage in interference resolution.    
Mechanisms of interference resolution in the RP task have been a subject of 
numerous neuroimaging investigations that have highlighted a role for left ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (L VLPFC) in this and other cognitive control tasks (Thompson-Schill, 
D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997; Jonides, et al., 1998; Nelson, et al., 2003; Badre & 
Wagner, 2005; Jonides & Nee, 2006; Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 2007).  In contrast, there is 
a paucity of work that examines the resolution of interference from multiple sources 
(though see Nee, Jonides, & Berman, 2007; Oztekin, Curtis, & McElree, 2008; Nelson, 
Reuter-Lorenz, Persson, Sylvester, & Jonides, 2009), and to our knowledge, no previous 
investigation has directly examined the influence of semantic context on the recent 
probes measure of PI in short-term memory. 
The purpose of the present work, therefore, was to systematically examine the 
relationship between PI and SI in short-term memory, and test the hypothesis that a 
common resolution process may be recruited to resolve both types of interference. Exp. 1 
examines the effects of articulatory suppression (AS) during the retention interval of 
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short-term memory tasks designed to assess each form of interference.  The effect of AS 
is of interest for two reasons, described below. 
 First, previous investigations of PI have shown this effect to be insensitive to a 
variety of manipulations, including the requirement to engage in AS during the inter-trial 
interval (ITI) of the RP task (Berman, Jonides & Lewis. 2009).  Lengthening the ITI also 
did not alter the PI effect appreciably, nor did instructing participants to attempt to ignore 
past sets (Berman, Jonides & Lewis, 2009).  These results show that participants are not 
rehearsing items from the past set, and that interference from previously studied items is 
not readily mitigated by strategic executive control.  We predicted that AS in the 
retention interval would increase the PI effect by decreasing the signal to noise ratio 
between trials on the current and past memory sets, thus making participants less able to 
distinguish RN probes from current memoranda.  If so, participants should show 
increased PI on AS trials, as well as an increased tendency to incorrectly recognize RN 
probes as items on the current set.   
Second, our previous investigations of SI have shown this measure to be 
insensitive to the requirement to engage in a math verification task during the retention 
interval (Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008).  We predicted the SI would in fact increase if 
our distraction task more directly interfered with subvocal rehearsal of current memory 
set items. If interference elicited by lure probes in our ST-DRM task is resolved by the 
same  process as PI, then AS during the retention interval should also increase SI by the 
same logic that predicts an increase in PI.  In both cases, AS should interfere with 
verbatim rehearsal processes (Levy, 1971; Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975), 
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reducing the distinctiveness of current memoranda by decreasing the signal to noise ratio 
of these items relative to recent negative or lure probes. 
The results from Exp. 1 indicate that AS increases both proactive and semantic 
interference effects.  These findings are consistent with our predictions that interfering 
with the rehearsal of items on the present memory set increases interference elicited by 
recent negative probes, which were previously studied but irrelevant to the current trial, 
and from lure probes, which were never studied but have become active through 
spreading semantic activations.   
In Exps. 2 and 3, we directly examine the relationship between SI and 
vulnerability to PI in a variant of the recent probes task. If the semantic relationship 
between the memory set and the probe can induce interference, perhaps semantic 
contextual tags can be leveraged to reduce PI in cases where the semantic context of a 
RN probe is incongruent with that of the current memory set.  By the same logic, PI may 
increase when a RN probe shares a semantic context with current memoranda. 
Consistent with these predictions, we find PI is reliably reduced, though not 
eliminated, when recent negatives are drawn from a separate semantic category than 
memoranda on the current trial, suggesting only limited release from proactive 
interference associated with the category shift.  Additionally, PI reliably increased when 
the semantic categories matched, suggesting that semantic context can change the degree 
to which we are vulnerable to proactive interference.   Within the additive factors 
framework (Sternberg, 1969), this interaction between semantic and episodic familiarity 
supports the notion that common cognitive process may be recruited to resolve 





Thirty-two participants (11 males; mean age=19.6 years) were recruited from the 
University of Michigan. All participants gave informed consent as reviewed by the 
university’s Institutional Review Board. Participants were paid $15 per hour for their 
participation plus bonuses for fast and accurate responding throughout the experiment. 
Bonus scores were calculated on a trial-by-trial basis with the following equation: 
Trial Score =  Probe_ACC* ( 700ms – Probe_RT) 
where probe accuracy (ACC) is a binary variable, 1 if correct and 0 if incorrect, and RT 
is response time. Individual trial scores were summed together to yield a total score. 
Participants were paid a penny for each point of their total score. 
 
Design/Procedure 
 In order to examine the effects of AS on proactive and semantic interference, we 
utilized a 2X2 mixed design, with interference type (PI vs. SI) as a between subjects 
variable and AS as a within subjects variable.  As such, half of all participants (n=16) 
completed the recent probes task (to assess PI), and half (n=16) completed the ST-DRM 
task (to assess SI).  Participants in each group completed two task blocks, one with AS 
and one without.  The order of Articulatory Suppression (AS) and No Suppression (no-




Recent probes task 
We used a recent-probes (RP) task to assess the effects of proactive interference 
(Fig. 1A). On each trial a set of 4 words was displayed for 2000ms. Following a variable 
length 3000-4000ms retention interval, a single probe word was displayed.  Participants 
needed to respond affirmatively if the probe was one of the words on the set, and 
negatively if not. The ‘No’ trials were of interest and came in two forms. The first type 
was a recent negative (RN) trial, in which the probe was not a member of the current set, 
but was a member of the previous set.  The second type was a standard nonrecent 
negative (NRN) trial, in which the probe was neither a member of the current set, nor a 
member of the two previous sets.  Previous work using this task has shown that 
participants are both delayed and less accurate when responding to these RN compared to 
NRN probes, and this difference in performance is an assay of proactive interference.  
We also utilized two forms of positive probes: recent positives (RPOS), which were 
present on the current memory and immediately preceding memory set, and non-recent 
positives (NRPOS), which were present in the current set, but not present in the two 
preceding trials.   
 
Short-term DRM task 
We used a short-term DRM paradigm (ST-DRM; Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008) 
to examine semantic interference (Fig. 1B).  The progression of each trial was similar to 
that of the RP task, except that memory sets consisted of 4 semantically related items, all 
associated with a common theme word.  As in the RP task, participants made a Y/N 
judgment in response to a probe presented following the retention interval.  During this 
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task, theme words served as the probes on all the trials. As in the RP task, there were two 
variations of “No” trials.  The first were unrelated negative (NEG) trials, in which the 
probe consisted of a theme word associated with a nonpresented list.  The second were 
lure  (LURE) trials, in which the probe consisted of the (unstudied) theme associated 
with the present memory set.  On positive (POS) trials, the associated theme was 
embedded in the memory set, and served as the positive probe.  No participant was 
exposed to a given theme or probe more than once during the experiment. The mean 
backward associative strength (BAS), a normed measure of the semantic association 
between each memoranda and the theme word (see Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & 
Gallo, 2001; Hancock & Hicks, 2002), was equated across memory lists. Probe type was 
counterbalanced with lists across participants.  This procedure ensured that participants 
encountered the same probes (all theme words) but in different contexts: as lures, 
unrelated negative probes, or positive probes. Trials were presented in random order for 
each participant. 
 
Articulatory Suppression  
On AS blocks, participants counted aloud from 1 to 3 repeatedly at a rate of 
approximately four utterances per second.  Counting began at the onset of a blue fixation 
cross which appeared just after encoding and stayed on the screen throughout the 
retention interval. The pace of counting was practiced prior to completion of the AS trial 
block.  During the experiment, counting was monitored to ensure compliance with task 




Figure 4.1.  
The Recent Probes and ST-DRM tasks used in Exp. 1.  In the RP task (A) recognition probes 
could be either non-recent negatives (NRN), recent negatives (RN), non-recent postives 
(NRPOS), or non-rencent postives (NRPOS).  In the ST-DRM task (B), probes could be 
either negative (NEG), postive (POS), or negative lure (LURE). During AS blocks for both 
tasks, the fixation point presented during the RI was bright blue rather than black.  
Participants began counting aloud from 1 to 3 repeatedly at the onset of this symbol and 




Results and Discussion 
The results from Exp. 1 were consistent with our initial predictions.  Both PI and 
SI effects significantly increased with the requirement to engage in AS during the 
retention interval.  Mean accuracy and median response times (RTs) for correct responses 
to each probe type in each task are presented in Figure 4.2.  In order to minimize the 
influence of outliers in our RT analyses, median RTs for each probe type were computed 
for each subject; mean group RT measures were computed from these medians.  
 
Proactive interference 
In order to examine the effects of probe recency and AS in the RP task, 2X2X2 
mixed effects analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted separately for positive 
and negative probes.  Within subjects variables were Probe Recency (recent vs. non-
recent) and AS condition (AS vs. no-AS).  Task Order (AS first vs. AS second) was 
included as a between subjects variable.  With respect to negative probes, we found main 
effects of Probe Recency on both accuracy, F=33.11, p<.001, η2=.70, and RT, F=53.19, 
p<.001, η2=.79, indicating that participants were both slower and less accurate in 
rejecting RN relative to NRN probes.  These findings replicate others that have 
demonstrated PI using similar paradigms, and indicate that our task succeeded in 
inducing PI.  Critically, we found a significant Probe Recency by AS interaction with 
respect to both accuracy, F=13.86, p<.005, η2=.50, and RT, F=42.49, p<.001, η2=.75, 
indicating that PI effects on both dependent measures increased with the requirement to 
engage in AS.  Our RT index of PI (RN-NRN) increased from a mean of 61.34 ms in the 
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non-AS condition to a mean of 134.25 ms in the AS condition.  Our accuracy measure of 
PI (NRN-RN) similarly increased from .04 in the non-AS condition to .15 in the AS 
condition.   
 
Figure 4.2.  
Mean accuracy and median RTs for the Recent Probes (Panels A and B) and ST-DRM tasks 
(Panels C and D) used in Exp.1.  Articulatory supression (AS) reliably increased both 
accuracy and RT indices of PI and SI. 
 
Collapsing across recent and non-recent negative probes, participants we less 
accurate, F=13.27, p<.005, η2=.49, but not reliably slower (p>.1) on AS blocks.  
Similarly, with respect to positive probes, participants were less accurate, F=8.65, p<.05, 
η2=.38, but not slower (p>.1) in responding to positive probes in AS blocks.  
Examination of RTs (Figure 4.2B) shows that AS selectively increased the time 
required to correctly reject RN probes.  Post-hoc paired t-tests showed no reliable 
increase in RT for any other probe type.  This indicates that AS selectively affected 
 84 
interference induced by RN probes, and was not associated with a general slowing of 
responses to other probe types.  
 
Semantic interference 
Mean accuracy and response times (RTs) for the ST-DRM task are presented in 
Figure 4.2, panels C and D, respectively.  Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted 
to assess the effects of negative probe type (neg. vs. lure), AS condition, and Task Order 
on both dependant measures.  Participants were less accurate in responses to lures, 
relative to negative unrelated probes, F = 25.20, p<.001, η2=.64.  Furthermore, correct 
rejections of lure probes were slowed relative to negative unrelated probes, F=29.01, 
p<.001, η2=.67.  These main effects replicate our previous work (Atkins & Reuter-
Lorenz, 2008) and demonstrate the effectiveness of the ST-DRM task in producing 
reliable measures of SI.  
Main effects of AS were found for negative probe accuracy, F=6.26, P<.05, 
η2=.31, and RT, F=10.70, p<.05, η2=.31,  indicating that, collapsing across lure and 
unrelated negative probes,  participants were both less accurate and slower to correctly 
respond in the AS block. Critically, we found reliable Probe Type by AS interactions on 
both probe accuracy, F= 5.81, p<.05, η2=.29, and RT, F=8.42, p<.05, η2=.34, indicating 
that both accuracy and RT measures of SI increased with AS.   Our RT index of SI 
(LURE-NEG) increased from a mean of 92 ms in the no-AS condition to a mean of 
173.88 ms in the AS condition.  Our accuracy measure of SI (NEG-LURE) also increased 
from .02 in the no-AS condition to .10 in the AS condition.   
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Taken together, results from Exp. 1 show that AS increases both proactive and 
semantic interference effects. One possibility is that articulatory suppression may reduce 
the availability of implicitly generated contextual tags that could be used to discern 
whether or not a probes’ familiarity is due to its membership in the current memory set 
(Nairne, 2002).  Such contextual tags need only to be consulted when the item-specific 
and familiarity-based memory processes conflict, as they do on recent probe trials.  
Another possibility is that AS may reduce the distinctiveness of current memoranda, 
lowering the signal to noise ratio between these items and those active due to previous 
study or spreading semantic activation.  Positive probes may maintain sufficient 
activation to support timely recognition, but this reduction in distinctiveness may lead to 
increased interference from RN and LURE probes.  
These findings are consistent with our predictions and suggest that interrupting 
rehearsal of items in the present memory set increases interference: 1) elicited by RN 
probes, which were previously studied but irrelevant to the current trial, and 2) from lure 
probes, which were never studied but have become active through spreading semantic 
activations.  This similar influence of the AS manipulation on both forms of interference 
suggests that a common cognitive control mechanism may be used to resolve interference 
from familiar probes, regardless of whether they are familiar because of recent study 
(temporal or episodic familiarity) or because they share a semantic context with items 






Results from Exp. 1 indicate that the requirement to engage in articulatory 
suppression during the retention interval increases both proactive and semantic 
interference in short-term memory.  Although the similar effects of AS on both PI and SI 
are consistent with the notion that similar psychological processes may underlie the 
resolution of both forms of interference, findings from Exp. 1 cannot speak directly to 
this possibility.    
In order to examine more directly the relationship between proactive and semantic 
interference, we conducted two additional experiments.  The presence of SI in short-term 
memory suggests that the semantic context of probes items is used in the recognition 
decision process.  Lure probes take longer to reject and are more likely to be falsely 
recognized because they are related in meaning to items currently in memory.  If the 
semantic relationship between the memory set and the probe can induce interference, 
perhaps semantic contextual tags can be leveraged to reduce PI in cases where the 
semantic context of a recent negative probe is incongruent with that of the current 
memory set.  
In Exp. 2 we explored this possibility in a paradigm that incorporates semantic 
categories into a standard RP task.  Participants completed two versions of the RP task, 
one of which utilized memory sets in which all memoranda were exemplars of a single 
semantic category, and one version in which they were not (i.e., the standard RP task).  If 
semantic information can be used to reduce PI, we would expect a reduction in PI when 
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RN probes are drawn from a different semantic category than items in the current 
memory set. 3 
Method 
Participants 
Ten participants (5 males; mean age 20.7 years) were recruited from the 
University of Michigan to participate in this study. All participants gave informed 
consent as reviewed by the University of Michigan’s Institutional Review Board. As in 
Exp. 1, participants were paid $15 per hour for their participation plus bonuses for fast 
and accurate responding throughout the experiment. 
 
Design/Procedure 
We used a modification of the recent-probes task (Exp.1) to jointly assess the 
effects of semantic and proactive interference within the same paradigm.  In order to 
incorporate semantic familiarity into the recent probes task, memory sets were drawn 
from two semantic categories, fruits and countries.  There were 50 words utilized as 
memoranda: 25 fruit words and 25 country words.  In the categorized (CAT) version of 
the task (Figure 4.3A), memory sets consisted of either all fruit words or all country 
words, with the category alternating from trial to trial in a predictable fashion (e.g., 
country-fruit-county…).  Because categories alternated on each trial, recent negative 
probes in this task were always members of a different category than the current memory 
                                                 
3 Exp. 2 was initially conceived by my collaborator Marc G. Berman, who was interested in the examining 
the standard recent probes effect with categorized stimuli. The experiment is included in this chapter 
because of its relevance to Exps. 1 and 3 which were motivated by my interest in understanding the 
relationship between PI and SI.  As discussed subsequently, Exp.3 extends and replicates Exp. 2, and was 
conceived collaboratively with Berman, but motivated more directly by my effort to analyze the 
relationship between PI and SI.   
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set.  Non-recent negative probes, on the other hand, could be either category-congruent or 
category-incongruent with memoranda.  In the mixed (MIX) version of the task (Figure 
4.3B), we used the same words, but memory sets contained a mixture of fruit and country 
names, making categorization of any single memory set impossible.  In this task probes 
were drawn equally from both semantic categories. 
There were 192 trials in both the Mixed and Categorized versions of the task.  In 
the Mixed version, there were 96 POS trials, 48 RN trials and 48 NRN trials.  For the 
sake of clarity, we will refer to these as POS_mixed, RN_mixed, NRN_mixed and 
NRN_mixed trials, respectively.  In the Categorized version of the experiment there were 
96 POS_match trials (that were items on the current memory set), 48 RN_mismatch trials 
(that were always from a different semantic category from the current memory set), 24 
NRN_match trials (that were from the current memory set’s semantic category) and 24 
NRN_mismatch trials (that were from a different semantic category from the current 
memory set). In these two versions of the task there were no Recent Positive trials. 
Exp. 2 utilized a within subjects design.  All participants completed both versions 
of the task.  The order of the task was counter-balanced across participants. This 
procedure allowed us to compare PI measures across two contexts, one in which semantic 
information could feasibly be used to improve task performance (mismatch trials) and 
one in which it could not (mixed trials).  If semantic category information can be 
leveraged to reduce PI when RN probes are from a different semantic category than 
memory set items, then we should find a reduction in PI on mismatch trials.  More 
specifically, RN_mismatch trials should be faster and less error prone than RN_mixed 
trials.  Our design also allowed us to explore SI effects on trials in which NRN probes 
 89 
were not members of the current set, but were members of the same semantic category.   
(NRN_match trials should be more difficult than NRN_mismatch trials because there is 
semantic interference).  This measure of SI may be less robust than that observed in the 
ST-DRM task in which memory sets were constructed from direct associates to lure 
items.  However, previous work on the associative nature of semantic memory has 
demonstrated semantic priming using category exemplars (Collins & Quillian, 1969; 
Neely, 1976; Huttenlocher & Kubicek, 1983).  We therefore predicted that the categorical 
relationship between memory items would be sufficient to induce spreading activation to 
unstudied category exemplars, thereby increasing their familiarity. 
 
Figure 4.3.  
The Categorized RP task used in Exp. 2, and Mixed RP task used in both Exp. 2 and Exp. 3.  
In both versions of the task, memoranda consisted of fruit and country words. In the CAT 
task (A) each memory set consisted of either all fruit or all country words. The category of 
memory sets alternated predictably from trial to trial (fruit-country-fruit-country). In MIX 





Figure 4.4.  
Mean accuracy and median RTs from Exp. 2. On mixed trials, which were 
blocked, memory sets included a mixture of words from two semantic categories (fruits and 
countries), and recent negative probes were drawn from each category with equal probability. 
On both mismatch and match trials (which appeared in the categorized block), memory sets 
contained items from only one semantic category. In Exp. 2, the semantic category of 
memory sets in the categorized block alternated from trial to trial. As such, recent negative 
(RN) probes were always drawn from the semantic category that was not presented on the 
current trial (mismatch). Non-recent negative trials were drawn from both semantic 




Results and Discussion 
In this experiment we found that semantic context could be used to mitigate PI if 
the semantic context of the past trial was different than the current trial.  Additionally, we 
also obtained a reliable SI effect in the recent probes task, which allowed us to compare 
and contrast both effects within the same experimental paradigm. 
Mean accuracy and median response times (RTs) for correct responses to each 
probe type are presented in Figure 4.4.  In order to assess the effects of Semantic Context 
and Probe Recency on accuracy and RT for negative probes, we conducted a 2x2x2 
mixed effects ANOVA including within subjects variables Semantic Context (mixed vs. 
mismatch), and Recency (recent vs. non-recent), and with Task Order as a between 
subjects variable (we analyzed the match trials separately, because there were no RN 
match trials in this experiment). We found a main effect for Recency on both accuracy, 
F=5.31, p<.05, η2=.40, and RT, F=35.01, p<.001, η2=.36, indicating that, collapsing over 
contexts, participants were slower and less accurate in their responses to recent vs. non-
recent negative probes (a replication of the standard recency effect).  The main effect for 
Semantic Context was reliable with respect to accuracy, F=7.45, p<.05, η2=.48, 
indicating increased accuracy on mismatch relative to mixed probes (see Fig. 3).  There 
was also a trend toward decreased RTs for mismatch vs. mixed probes, F=7.45, p<.07, 
η2=.36, though this main effect did not reach statistical significance.  
Critical to our question of whether semantic information can be leveraged to 
reduce PI, we found a reliable Semantic Context by Probe Recency interaction with 
respect to RT, F=5.68, p<.05, η2=.42, indicating a decrease in PI in the mismatched 
context.  A similar interaction pattern was shown for accuracy at a marginal level, 
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F=4.40, p<.07, η2=.36.  In order to directly assess the extent to which the semantic 
context of RN probes changed the amount of time required to correctly reject them, we 
conducted planned comparisons between probe accuracy and RT for RN_mismatch 
versus RN_mixed probes.  Results showed increased accuracy, t=2.77, p<.05, d=.97, and 
reduced RT, t=-2.65, p<.05, d=.64, for RN_mismatch probes relative to RN_mixed 
probes (see Figure 3).  These results indicate a reduction in interference when RN probes 
were drawn from a semantic category that differed from that present in the memory set of 
the current trial, and suggest that, as predicted, semantic information can be used to 
mitigate the effects of PI.  Interestingly, although interference was decreased, PI was still 
evident in RTs for these trials, with participants taking an average of 41ms (SE=11.34) 
longer to correctly reject a RN_mismatch vs. NRN_mismatch trials (t=3.62,p<.05, 
d=.50).  This indicates that even when the semantic context of an RN probe is 
incongruent with that of the current memory set, previously studied information 
continues to induce interference.   
In order to assess the effects of semantic familiarity independently from PI, we 
compared RT and accuracy for NRN_match and NRN_mismatch trials using paired t-
tests.  Both SI measures were reliable, t=5.31, p<.001, d=.57 for RT and t=2.89, p<.05, 
d=.92,for accuracy. This indicates that semantic interference was reliably induced by 
NRN probes that were drawn from the same semantic context as memory set items.  
 In summary, Exp. 2 showed significant reductions in PI when RN probes were 
drawn from a different semantic category than memory set items. This suggests that the 
semantic context of a recent negative probe can be used to mitigate PI.  On both mixed 
and mismatch trials, recent negative probes were those that have been studied recently, 
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and therefore should be activated more than non-recent negative probes.  However, on 
mismatch trials, the semantic context of the current memory set was incongruent with the 
recent negative probe.  One possibility, consistent with our interpretation of effects in 
Exp.1, is that the semantic tags are used as an additional source of information that may 
boost the signal to noise ratio between NRN and RN probes on mismatch trials (Nairne, 
2002). When the semantic context of each trial is predictable, the status of a recent 
negative probe is more efficiently resolved when this probe does not match the semantic 
context relevant for the current trial.  Intriguingly, although the magnitude of PI was 
reduced on mismatch trials, it was not entirely eliminated.  This suggests that recent 
exposure to an item produces reliable interference even when this item could be rejected 
based solely on its distinct semantic context.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Exp. 2 demonstrated that PI is reliably reduced when the semantic context of a 
RN probe is incongruent with that of the current memory set.  One explanation of this 
finding is that contextual cues contribute to the process by which the familiarity of a 
recent probe is adjudicated (Nairne, 2002).  Thus, when semantic cues associated with 
current memoranda are sufficiently distinct from those associated with RN probes, 
interference is reduced.   
This interpretation suggests that if the semantic context between current memory 
set and a RN probe overlaps, interference should increase due to the need to negotiate 
both the semantic and temporal familiarity of this item.  Exp. 3 was designed to examine 
this possibility.  We did this by incorporating RN probes from the same semantic 
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category as memoranda into Categorized RP task (Exp. 2).  This allowed for the 
assessment of two forms of RN trials: RN_match trials, in which the RN probe matched 
the semantic category of the current memory, and RN_mismatch trials, in which the RN 
probes where from a different semantic category.  This design allowed us to examine 
interference caused by both temporal and semantic familiarity using an additive factors 
framework (Sternberg, 1969). We predicted that if semantic tags are utilized in the 
assessment of recent negative probes, we should find a recency by semantic context 





Twenty-four participants (10 males; mean age 22.5 years) were recruited from the 
University of Michigan to participate in the study. All participants gave informed consent 
as reviewed by the University of Michigan’s Institutional Review Board. Participants 
were paid $15 per hour for their participation plus bonuses for fast and accurate 
responding throughout the experiment. Bonus scores were calculated as in Exps. 1 and 2. 
Procedure 
Exp. 3 employed the same Mixed RP task as Exp. 2 (Figure 4.3A).   We made a 
single change to the Categorized RP task: rather than alternating predictably, memory 
sets in the CAT version of the task varied randomly (see Figure 4.5).  This change made 
it possible for the same semantic category to appear on multiple trials in a row.  As such, 
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recent negative probes could be members of the same semantic category of the current 
memory set, or a semantically different category.  
 
Figure 4.5.  
The Categorized RP task utilized Exp. 3. Rather than alternating from trial to trial (fruit-
country-fruit-country), as in Exp. 2, the category membership of memory set stimuli in Exp. 3 
was unpredictable, such that adjacent trials could be drawn from either the same category 
(fruit-fruit) or different categories (fruit-country). This change allowed us to examine 2 types 
of RN and NRN probes. RN_match probes were recently studied items from the same 
category presented in the current memory set; RN_mismatch probes were recently studied 
items from a different category than that presented in the current memory set. Example trials 
are shown above. 
 
 
To accommodate these new RN trials, we increased the number of total trials to 
256.  In the MIX task, there were 128 POS_mixed trials, 64 RN_mixed trials and 64 
NRN_mixed trials.  In the CAT task there were 128 POS_match trials, 32 NRN_match 
trials, 32 NRN_mismatch trials, 32 RN_match trials and 32 RN_mismatch trials.  Across 
all trials in the CAT task, half of all memory set items and half of all probe items were 
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drawn from each semantic category.  As in Exp. 2, the same words were used in the MIX 
and CAT tasks; memory sets in the MIX task contained a mixture of fruit and country 
words, and probes were drawn equally from both semantic categories. 
 
Results and Discussion 
In Exp. 3 we found interactive effects between SI and PI. When RN probes were 
taken from the same semantic category as the current stimulus set we found that SI and PI 
interacted reliably.  In addition, we replicated our findings from Exp. 2, where semantic 
context could reliably mitigate PI if RN probes were drawn from a different semantic 
category than the current memory set.  
Mean accuracy and median RTs for correct responses to each probe type in each 
task are presented in Figure 4.6.  Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to assess 
the effects of Recency (recent vs. non-recent), Semantic Context (mixed, mismatch or 
mixed), and Task Order (MIX first vs. CAT first) on probe accuracy and RT.  With 
respect to negative probes, we found main effects of both Recency and Context on probe 
accuracy (F=32.94, η2=.60,  and F=16.86, η2=.43, respectively, p<.001 for both) and on 
RT for correctly rejected negative probes (F= 51.03, η2=..70, and F=10.39, η2=.32, 
respectively, p<.001 for both).  There was no main effect of Context on positive probe 
accuracy or RT, indicating that participants were equally fast and accurate at recognizing 




Figure 4.6.  
Mean accuracy and median RTs from Exp. 3. On mixed trials, which were 
blocked, memory sets included a mixture of words from two semantic categories 
(fruits and countries), and recent negative probes were drawn from each category 
with equal probability. On both mismatch and match trials (which appeared in the 
categorized block), memory sets contained items from only one semantic category. In 
Exp. 3, the semantic category of memory sets in the categorized block alternated 
randomly. Both recent negative (RN) and non-recent negative (NRN) probes were 
drawn with equal probability from either the same category as current memoranda 
(match trials), or from the other category (mismatch trials). 
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Critically, we found a Context by Recency interaction on both independent 
measures, F=9.92, η2=.31, for accuracy and F=7.86, η2=.26,  for RT, p<.001 for both, 
indicating that PI reliably varied between Mixed, Matched, and Mismatched semantic 
contexts.  In order to test our hypothesis that interference would increase when RN 
probes were drawn from the same semantic category of the current memory set, we 
conducted planned comparisons for RT and accuracy on RN_match vs. RN_mixed trials.  
Findings showed a significant 5% reduction in probe accuracy, t=-3.96, p<.001, d=.74, 
and a 27.5ms increase in RT, t=2.23, p<.05, d=1.29, associated RN_match vs. RN_mixed 
probes.  We also replicated findings from Exp. 2, demonstrating decreased interference 
when RN probes were drawn from a different semantic category than memoranda.  
Participants were 3% more accurate, t=2.63, p<.05, d=.63, and 30.5ms faster, t=2.90, 
p<.05, d=.31, for RN_mismatch vs. RN_mixed probes.    
 As in Exp. 2 we assessed the influence of SI independently from PI by comparing 
RT and accuracy for NRN_match and NRN_mismatch trials using paired t-tests.  Results 
replicated those findings, showing that NRN probes from the same semantic category 
were more error-prone, t=-2.28, p<.05, d=.53, and took longer to reject, t=2.27, p<.05, 
d=.18, than NRN probes from a different semantic category. 
Taken together, results from Exp. 3 suggest that the semantic relationship 
between RN probes and memory set items changes the extent to which these items 
induced proactive interference.  Consistent with predictions, we observed an interaction 
between Probe Recency and Semantic context, such that interference increased when RN 
probes shared a semantic context with memoranda, and decreased when semantic 
contexts were distinct. According the to the additive factors approach (Sternberg, 1969), 
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two manipulations that effect the same stages of cognitive processing should have 
interactive effects, whereas manipulations that effect separate stages of processing should 
have additive effects.  Within this framework, the observed interactions are consistent 
with the notion that a shared interference resolution process is recruited to resolve 
interference due to both temporal and semantic familiarity.  RN_match probes, which are 
both temporally and semantically familiar, induce more interference than RN_mixed 
probes, which have episodic familiarity but share no informative semantic relationship 
with the memory set.  RN_mismatch probes, which are temporally familiar but 
semantically distinct from memoranda, induce the least amount of PI. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
To date the effects of proactive and semantic interference in short-term memory 
have been investigated largely independently from one another.  The purpose of the 
present work was to jointly examine these effects, and determine the extent to which a 
common process may be recruited to resolve interference induced by both episodic and 
semantic familiarity.  Exp. 1 demonstrated that the requirement to engage in articulatory 
suppression during the retention interval of an item recognition task increased 
interference induced by the need to reject both recently studied items (PI), and items 
which had never been studied, but which were related in meaning current memoranda 
(SI).  That AS increased both SI and PI in similar ways suggests that some shared 
cognitive processes may underlie the resolution of both SI and PI.  Furthermore, this 
work replicates our previous findings (Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008) by showing 
semantic interference can be induced without a build-up of PI, demonstrating reliable SI 
 100 
using a paradigm in which lure probes were never studied and in which the semantic 
theme of each memory set was unique.    
Exps. 2 and 3 specifically investigated interactions between PI and SI by 
incorporating both episodic and semantic familiarity into a single paradigm.  Consistent 
with our predictions, we found an interaction between the semantic context of a recent 
negative probe and the amount of interference produced.  This suggests that our 
vulnerability to PI changes depending on the meaningful relationship between previously 
studied information and items currently in memory.  Interestingly, PI was reliably 
reduced when recent negative probes were drawn from a semantic context distinct from 
memoranda, suggesting that semantic cues can be leveraged to reduce interference from 
recently studied items.  Despite this reduction however, significant residual PI remained, 
suggesting that even when recent negative probes could feasibly be rejected based on 
semantic information alone, this was not sufficient to eradicate the pervasive effects of 
episodic familiarity.   
The reduction in PI induced by RN probes from a semantic context distinct from 
that of the memory set was complimented by an increased in PI when RN probes were 
drawn from the same semantic category. This interaction of semantic context and PI 
suggests that a common cognitive mechanism is recruited to resolve interference induced 
by both temporal and semantic familiarity, and offers support for cue-based and feature-
based unitary models of memory such as that proposed by Nairne (2002).  This model 
accounts for the pattern of interference effects we observe by predicting an increase in 
interference as cues become less distinct. For probes related in meaning to memoranda, 
there is overlap in the semantic cues associated with each, whereas for RN probes, there 
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is overlap in episodic cues.  When an RN probe shares a semantic context with 
memoranda, both semantic and episodic cues overlap, leading to increased interference.  
By the same token, when contextual cues become more distinct, interference is mitigated.   
The notion that semantic and episodic familiarity are resolved by common 
mechanisms is also consistent with a recent neuroimaging study, which showed overlap 
between neural mechanisms of semantic interference in a release from PI paradigm and 
those previously shown to mediate familiarity-based PI (Oztekin, et al., 2008).  
Furthermore, ongoing work in our lab (Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, in prep.) suggests 
common frontal regions are recruited in response to interference induced by the RP and 
ST-DRM tasks used here.   
The present work offers a unique contribution to the literature by showing that 
semantic context can change the degree to which we are vulnerable to PI, increasing this 
vulnerability when semantic context overlaps, and decreasing (though not eliminating) it 
when semantic contexts are distinct. Taken together, these findings are consistent with 
the notion that a shared cognitive control is recruited in service of resolution of multiple 
forms of interference (Oztekin, et al., 2008; Nelson, et al., 2009).  Furthermore, this work 
may contribute to the burgeoning field of research focused on the development of 
cognitive training regimens that may reduce interference-induced memory distortions 
(Persson & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008).  Identification of the circumstances in which 
interference is mitigated and enhanced may be crucial to both the development of 
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Summary of findings 
 The present dissertation examined distortions of memory that occur within 
seconds of encoding.  In Chapter II, I provide evidence for false recall and recognition of 
unstudied items related in meaning to recently encoded memoranda.  These findings 
highlight the vulnerability of verbatim memory processes, even when rehearsal of 
memoranda is uninterrupted and retention intervals are short (Exps. 2A and B).  The 
incidence of false recall under these conditions is particularly striking, and suggests that 
unstudied lure items may sometimes become explicitly activated either at the time of 
encoding itself, or immediately thereafter (Underwood, 1965; Roediger, McDermott, & 
Robinson, 1998).    
 In recognition, correct rejection of lure items was remarkably slower than correct 
rejection of unrelated negative probes, suggesting that even when lures are not 
recognized as studied items, they induce interference that must be resolved in the service 
of accurate task performance.  This interference resolution process is further examined in 
Chapters III and IV, in which I investigate the neural mechanisms associated with this 
process, and explore the relationship between this form of interference and proactive 
interference (PI) induced by episodic familiarity.  
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 Neuroimaging results (Chapter III) show that semantic interference (SI) is 
associated with increased activation in a left mid-ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (L 
VLPFC) and a region of right posterior parietal cortex (R PPC) along the superior 
boarder of the intra-parietal sulcus (IPS).  Region of interest (ROI) analyses of brain-
behavior relationships in these two regions revealed a positive correlation between 
individual differences in L VLPFC activation and response time (RT) indices of SI.  This 
finding replicates reports of similar correlations between activity in this region and PI 
induced by the need to reject a recently studied item that is no longer task relevant 
(Jonides & Nee, 2006).  Comparisons between probe-related activity to lures that were 
correctly rejected and falsely recognized indicate that L VLPFC responds to the presence 
of interference in both cases, and does not distinguish between instances in which 
interference resolution is successful (correct rejections) and when it fails (false alarms).   
By contrast, R PPC activity showed a marginal negative correlation between 
changes in activation for lure vs. negative probes and reductions in SI.  This finding 
suggests this region may play a role in adjudicating the familiarity of lure items in 
support of timely and accurate task performance. This interpretation gained support from 
an exploratory functional connectivity analysis demonstrating positive correlations 
between R PPC and activations in a network of regions associated with source memory 
and decision making under uncertainty.  Taken together, these findings suggest a possible 
distinction between regions that respond to the detection of interference in our 
environment and those that support accurate task performance the face of this 
interference.  
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The observation that L VLPFC responds similarly to SI and PI is consistent with 
the hypothesis that a common cognitive process may be recruited for interference 
resolution associated with both semantic (SI) and episodic (PI) familiarity.   Chapter IV 
describes a series of investigations that test this hypothesis by examining the relationship 
between these two forms of interference in short-term memory.   Results show an 
increase in both SI and PI resulting from the need to engage in articulatory suppression 
during the retention interval.  Furthermore, the semantic context of recently studied items 
predicts the extent to which these stimuli induce interference.  When recent negative 
items are drawn from a semantic category that is distinct from that associated with the 
current memory set, PI is reduced.  This suggests that semantic information can be 
leveraged to reduce interference in these cases.  When recent negative probes are drawn 
from the same semantic category as current memoranda, PI is increased, suggesting over-
additive effects of semantic and episodic familiarity.  
Further considerations 
Unitary vs. multi-storage models of memory 
 Although the current investigations cannot directly distinguish between unitary 
and multi-storage models of memory (see Chapter I), they are consistent with multi-
storage models that include components that allow for interactions between 
representations in short and long-term memory.  For example, in a revised version of his 
working memory model, Baddeley (2000) proposed the episodic buffer, a slave to the 
central executive, that contains multi-dimensional representations of knowledge gathered 
from several sources.  These sources include representations from episodic memory, as 
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well as the contents of the phonological and visuospatial buffers.  The episodic buffer 
accounts for influences of episodic and semantic memory on short-term remembering by 
providing a point of cross-talk between architecturally separate short- and long-term 
memory systems.  
Although this is a reasonable account of semantic influences on short-term 
memory, evidence in support of the episodic buffer has been elusive (see Jonides, Lewis, 
Nee, Lustig, et al., 2008).  By proposing a replication of long-term memory 
representations in the episodic buffer, the account lacks parsimony.  Furthermore, 
Baddeley (2000) assumes that conscious awareness is associated with retrieval from the 
buffer.  This claim is difficult to reconcile with findings that PI is evident even when 
subjects are not consciously aware of manipulations of probe recency, and continues to 
occur when subjects are explicitly instructed to ignore information from past memoranda 
(Berman, Jonides, & Lewis, 2009).  These findings suggest that retrieval of long-term 
memory representations need not be accompanied by conscious awareness, and that such 
representations can implicitly interfere with verbatim retrieval from short-term memory.  
Given these considerations, results from the present investigations may be more 
parsimoniously accounted for by unitary feature-based accounts of memory such as 
Nairne’s (2002).  According to this model, what is retained over the short- and long-term 
is not a particular series of items, but a set of activated features corresponding to task-
relevant dimensions of memoranda.  Overlap between features associated with 
memoranda and those activated at retrieval results in interference, and increases the 
probability of memory errors.  An overlap between semantic features thus results in SI, 
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while an overlap in episodic features results in PI.  When both semantic and episodic 
features overlap, interference is maximized (Chapter IV).   
Another reason to favor this unitary-store account pertains to the localization of 
memory processes in the brain.  Baddeley’s revised multi-store model (Baddeley, 2000) 
remains inconsistent with findings demonstrating considerable overlap between the 
neural mechanisms supporting short- and long-term remembering (Cabeza, Dolcos, 
Graham, & Nyberg, 2002; Ranganath & Blumenfeld, 2005; Karlsgodt, Shirinyan, van Ep, 
Cohen, & Cannon, 2005; Ranganath & Blumenfeld, 2005).  By assuming a single set of 
memory representations, the unitary activation-based account is consistent with the 
notion that a common neural system is recruited to access these representations in both 
short- and long-term memory. 
 
Phenomenology 
 Throughout the present dissertation, I use the term false memory, to describe 
erroneous recognition and recall of unstudied items that share a meaningful relationship 
with recently encoded memoranda.  I often employ this term in favor of false alarm and 
intrusion in order to highlight the similarity of these effects to semantic distortions that 
have been documented in long-term memory (see Chapter I).  There is an outstanding 
question, however, regarding the phenomenological experience associated with false 
recall and recognition that occurs only seconds post-study.  Investigations using standard 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigms (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995) have indicated that false recall and recognition are often associated with strong 
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subjective feelings of memory, and that these errors are often made with high levels of 
confidence (Gallo, 2006).    
 Recent investigations in our lab suggest that similar phenomenological feelings of 
remembering accompany false recognition in our ST-DRM paradigm (Flegal, Atkins, & 
Reuter-Lorenz, in preparation).  For instance, Flegal et al. (in prep.) examined confidence 
and remember/know judgments associated with false recognition that occurred either 4 
seconds or 20 minutes following encoding 4-item DRM memory sets.  Results showed 
that subjects were equally confident in their false recognitions of lures across both delays.  
Furthermore, rates of remember judgments, which connote strong feelings of subjective 
recollection, were equivalent for lure probes presented following long and short retention 
intervals.  These findings suggest that the short-term memory distortions described in the 
present dissertation are associated with the similar subjective experiences of 
remembering, and bolster support for the notion that common associative processes of 




The present work demonstrates the surprising limitations of verbatim memory 
processes, and shows that memory is vulnerable to considerable distortion within a very 
short timeframe.  This work was equally motivated by investigations demonstrating false 
memory in the episodic domain (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 
Roediger, 1996; Loftus, 1997, 2003; Schacter, Chiao, & Mitchell, 2003; Schacter & 
Slotnick, 2004; Gallo, 2006), and findings concerning interference resolution and 
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cognitive control in short-term retrieval (Jonides, Smith, Marshuetz, Koeppe, & Reuter-
Lorenz, 1998; Nelson, Reuter-Lorenz, Sylvester, Jonides, & Smith, 2003; Jonides & Nee, 
2006; Badre & Wagner, 2007).  Taken together, these findings suggest that short-term 
remembering is vulnerable to semantic distortion that mirrors false memory effects 
described in relation to episodic and autobiographical memory.  Furthermore, there may 
be considerable overlap between the cognitive and neural mechanisms that allow for the 
successful resolution of interference induced by semantic and episodic similarity across a 
variety of tasks.  Future work will serve to elucidate our understanding of the 
circumstances in which we are most vulnerable to interference and memory distortion.  
Such investigations may allow for the development of more accurate models of memory 
and performance in the real world, and may contribute to the design of cognitive 
interventions to reduce the extent to which this vulnerability leads to errors in judgment 
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